



John Dinsdale on Intellectual Self-knowledge

An edition of the prooemium and questions I.1 and III.15 of John Dinsdale's Quaestiones in De anima

Christensen, Michael Stenskjær

Published in:

Universite de Copenhague. Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin. Cahiers

Publication date:

2017

Citation for published version (APA):

Christensen, M. S. (2017). John Dinsdale on Intellectual Self-knowledge: An edition of the prooemium and questions I.1 and III.15 of John Dinsdale's Quaestiones in De anima. *Universite de Copenhague. Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin. Cahiers*, 86, 79–131.

UNIVERSITÉ DE COPENHAGUE

**CAHIERS
DE
L'INSTITUT DU MOYEN-ÂGE GREC ET LATIN**

86

Centre for the Aristotelian Tradition

Saxo Institute

2017

John Dinsdale on intellectual self-knowledge

*An edition of the prooemium and questions I.1 and III.15 of John Dinsdale's
Quaestiones in De anima**

Michael Stenskjær Christensen

1 Introduction

This is an edition of the prologue and two questions concerning intellectual self-knowledge from John Dinsdale's *Quaestiones in De anima*. The edition is supplied with a translation, and in an appendix the prologue is compared with Giles of Rome's prologue to his *Expositio De anima*, on which it is most likely based. In this introduction I present the text and author and describe the two witnesses in which the text is preserved.

1.1 Author and authorship

We find references to this author under a variety of names such as Dydneshale, Tytyngsale, Dimsdale, and he has also been confused with John Titlesale whose name occurs in a similar range of variants. But the proper name is Dinsdale, taken from the identical place-name at the river Tees in Durham and Yorks.¹ John Dinsdale is not particularly well known, and the texts preserved in his name are also relatively few. He was an Oxford master of arts, became fellow at Merton College in 1284–5 and was appointed subwarden in 1286. He died around 1289.²

Aside from the questions on *De anima*, he also wrote questions on *Nicomachean Ethics I–IV* and *Metaphysics I–XII*.³ He has also been ascribed the author-

* This publication is produced within and financed by the project *Representation and Reality: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on the Aristotelian Tradition*, which, thanks to a grant from *The Swedish National Bank's Tercentenary Foundation (Riksbankens Jubileumsfond)* and additional funding from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, has been running from early 2013.

¹ Sharpe 1997, p. 236; Rud 1825, p. 304. Emden (1957, p. 1926), who jumbles the two Johns together, uses Tytyngsale. Lohr (1971, p. 289) and Mora-Márquez (2014, p. 215) use the almost identical Tytyngsale. I follow Sharpe and Thomson 2011, pp. 245, 381.

² Sharpe 1997, p. 236; Lohr 1971, p. 289; Emden 1957, p. 1926.

³ Thomson 2011, p. 383. According to Sharpe (1997, p. 236) the questions on the *Metaphysics* are preserved in Durham Cathedral Library C.IV.20 as the first item, Cambridge, Gonville & Gaius College 611/341, ff. 146r–181, and Oxford, Oriel College 33, ff. 336r–374. The *Eth-*

ship of a *Quaestiones super Aristotelis de animalibus* in the colophon of Oriel 33 (f. 323vb), but this is by Albert the Great.⁴

1.2 Witnesses

Quaestiones in De anima is preserved in two manuscripts: Oxford, Balliol College 311, ff. 148r–181v and Oxford, Oriel College 33, ff. 164r–182v.

Balliol College 311 is composed of two late 13th-century manuscripts and contains 223 leaves in total, both written in two columns. According to Thomson the codex measures 345 x 225 mm with a text field of 270 x 180 mm. He characterizes the hand of the first manuscript, on folios 1–181, as a “gothic rotunda with some anglicana features”, and the second, on folios 182–223, as a “good anglicana”.⁵ With the exception of Dinsdale’s *De anima*-commentary which is followed by Albert the Great’s *Quaestiones in De animalibus I*, the codex only contains works by Thomas Aquinas. The codex contains the following texts:

2r–39v Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in De anima*.

39v–26v id., *Expositio in libros Physicorum*.

126v–42v id., *Expositio in De sensu et sensibilibus*.

142v–48r id., *Expositio in De memoria et reminiscencia*.

148r–81v John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima*.

182r–86v Albert the Great, *Quaestiones in De animalibus I*.

188r–223v Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in libros Analyticorum posteriorum*

Oriel College 33 is also composed of two late 13th-century manuscripts, the first of which is just a list of contents to the second, which contains all the texts. The manuscript with the list of contents measures 260 x 160 mm with a text field of 200 x 150 mm. The main manuscript measures 275 x 190 mm with a text

ics-commentary is preserved in Durham Cathedral Library C.IV.20 as the second item, and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, section de médecine, MS. H. 293, ff. 84r–131r. Sharpe refers to them as lectures, while they are questions according to Rud 1825, p. 304 and Lohr 1971, p. 289, both statements may very well be true.

⁴ Thomson 2011, p. 382; Fauser 1982, pp. 170–171; Lohr 1971, p. 289.

⁵ Thomson 2011, p. 244.

field of 215 x 160 mm.⁶ Both manuscripts are written in two columns. The main manuscript contains 418 leaves (iv + 414), with the outer leaves as additions from the modern rebinding. It has three foliations, a medieval in brown ink and two modern in pencil, the oldest of which is two and the most recent three values higher than the original foliation. I use the most recent modern foliation. The manuscript is written by a single hand of, as Thomson puts it, “neat anglicana of university type”.⁷ The texts of this manuscript are mostly anonymous and all belong to the Aristotelian tradition:

- 1r–7v Table of contents.
- 8r–79v Anonymus, *Quaestiones in Physica I–V*.
- 80r–97v Anonymus, *Quaestiones in Meteora*.
- 98r–114v Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De generatione et corruptione I*.
- 120–162v Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De anima*.⁸
- 164r–182v John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima*.
- 184r–187r Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De memoria et reminiscentia*.⁹
- 192r–197v Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De sensu et sensibilibus*.
- 199r–261r Anonymus, *Quaestiones in Metaphysica I–VII*.
- 262r–268r Anonymus, *Quaestiones in Metaphysica VII*.
- 273r–323v Albert the Great, *Quaestiones in De animalibus*.
- 323v–229v Anonymus, *Quaestiones de Motu animalium*.
- 330r–335v Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De iuventute et senectute et morte et vita*.
- 339r–383r John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in Ethica Nicomachea I–IV*.¹⁰
- 385v–410v Anonymus, *Sophismata*.

⁶ These measures are reported by Thomson, but I have confirmed them in person.

⁷ Thomson 2011, p. 381. The manuscript has also recently been described in Ebbesen 2016, pp. 128–130, cf. Ebbesen and Goubier 2010, pp. 1.36–37.

⁸ Thomson incorrectly lists this and the preceding item as literal commentaries.

⁹ Recently published in Ebbesen 2016.

¹⁰ Edition by Taki Suto, Kyoto, in preparation.

Other manuscripts have also been thought to contain Dinsdale's commentary. Mynors makes an opaque reference to Durham Cathedral Library C.IV 20 and Merton 276.¹¹ His reference to the Durham manuscript probably just means that it contains other texts ascribed to Dinsdale, namely his questions on the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The Durham manuscript does not contain the *De anima* commentary.¹²

Merton 276 has probably been mentioned as there are connections between some of its first texts and Oriel 33, which also contains Dinsdale's *De anima* commentary. In Merton 276, ff. 13r–16v, we find the beginning of a question commentary on *De anima* I, and folios 165r–176r contain a fragment of a question commentary on book three. But neither of these commentaries contain Dinsdale's text. The first commentary follows upon an anonymous question commentary to *De memoria* which shares some material with the *De memoria* commentary which follows Dinsdale's questions in Oriel 33.¹³ But that is as close as those two commentaries get.¹⁴ The second commentary in Merton 276, on folios 165r–176r, has also been thought to be Dinsdale's text. This suggestion seems to go back to Sharpe and is mirrored in Thomson.¹⁵ My comparison of the two manuscripts makes it clear that these two texts are also different. These observations correspond with those of Oyarzabal Aguinagalde.¹⁶

The text in Oriel 33 ends abruptly in the middle of question II.32 on the folio break between 179v and 180r. From 180r we find questions to *De anima* III in a text that is not Dinsdale's. It does not look like the beginning of a commentary, as there is no indication of a new text starting there, maybe aside from the fact that the folio begins with the beginning of a question. This means that the text

¹¹ Mynors 1963, p. 328.

¹² Lohr 1971, p. 289. On the *Metaphysics* commentary, see Ermatinger 1979; Thro and Ermatinger 1992; Thro and Ermatinger 1993.

¹³ Ebbesen (2016, pp. 130–131) describes the correspondences between these two texts along with the commentaries by Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito and an anonymous commentary in Paris BnF, lat. 16160, ff. 119ra–123vb, cf. also Ebbesen, Thomsen Thörnqvist, and Decaix 2015.

¹⁴ See the questions lists on page 114 to 122 where it is also apparent that we have four entirely different texts. The erroneous connection seems to go back to Powicke (1931, p. 136). Thomson finds (Thomson 2011, p. 329; Thomson and Wilson 2009, p. 214) that it begins like Giles of Rome's commentary (thereby referring to his *expositio*), but that is an overstatement. They just share an initial reference to Averroes.

¹⁵ Sharpe 1997, pp. 236–237; Thomson 2011, p. 330. Both also refer to Lohr, although he makes no reference to the Merton manuscript in his article on Dinsdale.

¹⁶ Oyarzabal Aguinagalde 1990, p. 178.

has been mistaken to belong to Dinsdale's commentary, although it actually is a different text.¹⁷ In some cases the question titles of Dinsdale's commentary and the subsequent commentary in Oriel correspond, but even in those cases the text is different. It therefore seems to have no relation to Dinsdale's text. As can be seen in the questions in table 4.3 on page 121, the text only contains five questions, all on the intellect.

1.3 Text, context and date

The purpose of this partial edition is to make available a source to the debate on intellectual self-knowledge as it took place in the Aristotelian commentaries and arts faculties of the late middle ages. Traditionally, scholarship on the medieval discussions about self-knowledge centers around the canonical authors with a focus on texts stemming from the theological faculty with *artes* material playing a mostly ancillary role.¹⁸

It is not at all uncommon in question commentaries on *De anima* to find questions on self-knowledge as well as discussions of the related problems in the first, often methodologically orientated, questions. This commentary represents an example of how this could be discussed at the end of the 13th century. The first question focuses on whether the soul is intelligible to itself, as that seems to be a prerequisite for acquiring knowledge about it. The question from book three discusses whether the knowledge that the intellect has of itself is acquired through its own essence or in the same way as it acquires knowledge about external objects. This question reflects a conflict between the Augustinian view that the soul or mind (*anima* but also often *mens*) is transparent to itself, and has knowledge of itself by its own essence, and the Aristotelian view that the intellect cannot be known until it has been actualized by the species of an external object. At the *artes* faculty this discussion is expected to fall out in favour of the Philosopher. Several questions in Dinsdale's commentary to *Metaphysics XII* are also relevant to this theme.¹⁹

Although the text makes no explicit references to Aquinas, it displays a very

¹⁷ Oyarzabal Aguinagalde 1990, p. 178 has noticed this.

¹⁸ For instance Lopez 2016; Perler and Schierbaum 2014; Cory 2014; Schierbaum 2014; Brower-Toland 2013; Sanguinetti 2013; Martin 2007; Lambert 2007; Putallaz 1991a and Putallaz 1991b. An exception would be Zupko 2007.

¹⁹ See in particular questions 23: *Utrum primum principium intelligat se ipsum*, 24: *Utrum primum principium sit suum intelligere*, and 27: *Utrum intellectus primi principii sit discursivus*. All of the questions to *Metaphysics XII* are edited in Thro and Ermatinger 1993.

strong doctrinal reliance on him. Several of the arguments of question III.15 follow Aquinas's corresponding article in the *Summa* closely, often even in phrasing.²⁰ The arguments used by Aquinas are also used more broadly, but the order and manner of presentation clearly reveals the dependence on Aquinas in that question. I have not identified a similar strong reliance on any particular source in the first question, although the arguments presented are well known from the period.²¹

We also find a striking similarity between Dinsdale's prologue and that of Giles of Rome's literal commentary on *De anima*.²² A comparison with Giles's text shows that the first part of the prologue contains an almost identical text, while they diverge slightly more as the text develops, although they maintain the same content and structure throughout. I present the two texts synoptically in section 5 on page 123.

Aguinagalde dates the text to between 1284 and 1289 and thereby confines it to Dinsdale's fellowship at Merton College, seemingly with the argument that we know nothing about his activities before he enters Merton.²³ But in the incipit of the Durham manuscript his *Ethics* and *Metaphysics* questions are dated to 1283.²⁴ If we accept that date, we cannot exclude the possibility that the *De anima* questions also predate his entry into Merton College. To establish an earlier *terminus post quem*, we should consider his heavy dependence on the works of Aquinas, not least the *Summa*, which makes it safe to say that it cannot be much earlier than the early 70's. This can be restricted a bit further by observing his dependence on Giles of Rome's *expositio* in the prologue, which is most likely from 1274 or shortly thereafter.²⁵ This leaves us with the less constricted time span from 1274 until 1289. As the only information we have about his teaching activities are limited to the 80's, it might not be entirely unreasonable to place the *Quaestiones in De anima* in the 1280's, although we cannot reject the possibility of a slightly earlier dating.

²⁰ Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.87, art. 1. The whole *quaestio* is titled "Quomodo anima intellectiva seipsam et ea quae sunt in ipsa cognoscat", and the first article is titled "Utrum anima intellectiva seipsam cognoscat per suam essentiam".

²¹ I am currently working on a monograph where these networks are studied more extensively.

²² Mynors (1963, p. 328) notes this. He has seen Aegidius's prologue in Balliol College 119, ff. 112–186, but it is preserved in numerous manuscripts, cf. Lohr 1967, p. 332.

²³ Oyarzabal Aguinagalde 1990, p. 180.

²⁴ According to Rud 1825, p. 304: "Questiones XII' librorum Metaphysice et IV librorum Ethicorum disputate a Mag'ro Jo. de Ditchensale Anno D'ni M.CC. octogesimo tertio."

²⁵ Del Punta, Donati, and Luna 1993, pp. 320–321.

References

- Brower-Toland, Susan C. (2013). "Olivi on Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: the Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Mind's Reflexivity". In: *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 1, pp. 136–168.
- Cory, Therese Scarpelli (2014). *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Del Punta, Francesco, Silvia Donati, and Concetta Luna (1993). "Egidio Romano". In: *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*. Vol. 42: *Dugoni-Enza*. Ed. by Alberto M. Ghisalberti. 79 vols. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana.
- Ebbesen, Sten (2016). "Anonymus Orielensis 33 on *De memoria*. An Edition". In: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 85, pp. 128–161.
- Ebbesen, Sten and F. Goubier (2010). *A Catalogue of 13th-century Sophismata*. 2 vols. Paris: Vrin.
- Ebbesen, Sten, Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist, and Veronique Decaix (2015). "Questions on *De sensu et sensato*, *De memoria* and *De somno et vigilia*. A Catalogue". In: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 57, pp. 59–115.
- Emden, Alfred Brotherson (1957). *A biographical register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Ermatinger, Charles J. (1979). "John of Tytynsale (d. ca. 1289) as the Pseudo Scotus of the questions on Metaphysics X and XII (The Fifth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies, abstracts)". In: *Manuscripta* 23, p. 7.
- Fauser, Winfried (1982). *Opera omnia. Die Werke des Albertus Magnus in ihrer handschriftlichen Überlieferung. Teil I, Die echten Werke*. Aschendorff.
- Lambert, Richard T. (2007). *Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas. The Angelic Doctor on the Soul's Knowledge of Itself*. Author House.
- Lohr, Charles H. (1967). "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A-F". In: *Traditio* 23, pp. 313–413.
- (1971). "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Johannes de Kanthi – Mynogodus". In: *Traditio* 27, pp. 251–351.
- Lopez, Lydia Deni Gamboa (2016). "William of Ockham and Walter Chatton on Self-Knowledge". PhD thesis. Montréal: Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Martin, Christopher J. (2007). "Self-knowledge and cognitive ascent: Thomas Aquinas and Peter Olivi on the KK-thesis". In: *Forming the Mind. Essays on the internal senses and the mind/body problem from Avicenna to the medical enlightenment*. Ed. by Henrik Lagerlund. Dordrecht: Springer.

- Mora-Márquez, Ana María (2014). "A List of Commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* III (c. 1200–c.1400)". In: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 83, pp. 207–256.
- Mynors, Roger (1963). *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College Oxford*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oyarzabal Aguinagalde, Manuel (1990). "Las cuestiones al libro tercero *De anima* de John de Tytyngsale". In: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 57, pp. 177–269.
- Perler, Dominik and Sonja Schierbaum, eds. (2014). *Selbstbezug und Selbstwissen*. Frankfurt an Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
- Powicke, F.M. (1931). *The Medieval Books of Merton College*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Putallaz, François-Xavier (1991a). *La connaissance de soi au XIIIe siècle: de Matthieu d'Aquasparta à Thierry de Freiberg*. Paris: J. Vrin.
- (1991b). *Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Vrin.
- Rud, Thomas (1825). *Codicum Manuscriptorum Ecclesiæ Cathedralis Dunelmensis. Catalogus Classicus*. Cum appendice eos codices continente qui post catalogum confectum diversis temporibus comparati sunt. Durham.
- Sanguineti, Juan José (2013). "The Ontological Account of Self-Consciousness in Aristotle and Aquinas". In: *Review of Metaphysics* 67.2, pp. 311–344.
- Schierbaum, Sonja (2014). "Ockham on the Possibility of Self-Knowledge: Knowing Acts without Knowing Subjects". In: *Vivarium* 52.3-4, pp. 220–240.
- Sharpe, Richard (1997). *A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540*. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Thomson, Rodney M. (2011). *Catalogue of Medieval manuscripts of Latin commentaries on Aristotle in British libraries*. Vol. 2: Oxford. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Thomson, Rodney M. and N. G. Wilson (2009). *A descriptive catalogue of the medieval manuscripts of Merton College, Oxford*. Oxford: D. S. Brewer.
- Thro, L. J. and Charles J. Ermatinger (1992). "Questions on Aristotle, Metaphysics X and XII, by Master John Dymdale (I)". In: *Manuscripta* 36.2, pp. 71–124.
- (1993). "Questions on Aristotle, Metaphysics X and XII, by Master John Dymdale (II)". In: *Manuscripta* 37.2, pp. 107–167.
- Zupko, Jack (2007). "Self-Knowledge and Self-Representation in Later Medieval Psychology". In: *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima*. Ed. by Paul J. J. M. Bakker and J. M. M. H Thijssen. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 87–108.

2 Edition

2.1 Ratio edendi

As already mentioned, there are two witnesses to the text, Oxford, Balliol College 311, ff. 148r–181v (B) and Oxford, Oriel College 33, ff. 164r–182v (O). O only contains the prologue, book one and part of book two (to question II.32).

The relationship between the two witnesses can be summarised as follows.

- They differ in 166 instances, 119 in the prologue and 47 in question I.1.
- The vast majority of variants are of no or marginal consequence to the quality of the text. But it can be observed that O in many instances presents a more explicit or clearly phrased text.
- In 17 cases O presents a better text.²⁶
- In 5 cases B presents a better text, although one of the errors in O can be given a simple explanation.²⁷
- In 4 cases O has been corrected to a phrasing identical to that of B, while the inverse is the case 3 times.²⁸ This is particularly interesting as it could reveal relations between witnesses under certain circumstances. But the almost equal amount of this type of corrections, and the other variants, make it very difficult to conclude anything on this basis.
- In 3 cases the two share an error or have similar problems.²⁹

As we see here, O generally contains a better text than B, so when possible, I base the edition on O, supplemented with B when necessary. Question III.15 is only preserved in B, so for that question we have to make do with that.

The transcriptions are made from high quality colour photographs. I have photographed the Oriel manuscript myself while the photographs of the Balliol

²⁶ See (references to <page>.<line(s)>) 91.12, 91.17, 93.9, 93.16, 93.18, 93.18, 91.3, 91.9, 95.10–10, 96.9, 96.15, 96.19, 96.24, 97.14, 97.16–17, 97.22 and 97.24.

²⁷ See 96.10, 97.5, 97.18, 97.19. In 95.12 O reads ‘vespertilionis’ and B ‘nycticoracis’. In all other cases both witnesses read ‘nycticorax’ and should therefore be preferred. Both terms go back to νυκτερίς in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* II.1. But ‘vespertilio’ comes in from the Latin translation of the relevant part of Averroes commentary on *Metaphysics*.

²⁸ O corrected to be line B: 92.9, 92.13, 92.11 and 94.7. B corrected to be like O: 91.10, 91.12 and 93.14.

²⁹ See 95.12, 96.19 and 97.15.

manuscript have been provided by the Balliol College archivist and curator of manuscripts, Ms Anna Sander.³⁰ In no cases do the reproductions leave a reader in doubt about what the manuscripts look like.

I have imposed my own classicising orthography, and my own paragraphing and punctuation. Section headings and the structural numbers (e.g. *1.1*, *2.1*, *Ad 3.1* etc.) are meta-text added by me. Both scribes make abundant use of abbreviations, the expansion of which I generally do not indicate.

It should be noted that the question from book three has already been published as part of a transcription of the complete third book.³¹ Unfortunately the transcription is not entirely reliable. Misreadings occur (some of which might be explained by a low quality reproduction), occasionally a line is skipped, and although no indications of editorial changes of the text are given, I have registered some discrepancies between the transcription and the manuscript (mostly unnoticed additions). I note the diverging readings in my critical apparatus.

The edition is registered in the *Scholastic Commentaries and Texts Archive*.³² The source documents for the text edition are openly available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 license.³³

2.2 Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to the always patient Prof Dr Sten Ebbesen who has invested much time in helping me read and analyze the manuscripts, establish the text, and improve the translation.

I am also grateful to Ms Anna Sander, Archivist and Curator of Manuscripts at Balliol College for photographing the relevant parts of Balliol College 311 for me.

³⁰ The images have subsequently been made freely available online at <https://www.flickr.com/photos/balliolarchivist/sets/72157663122113189/>.

³¹ Oyarzabal Aguinagalde 1990.

³² See <http://scta.info>.

³³ For more info, see <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>. Data and links to the XML TEI files can be found on <http://scta.info/resource/da-49-prooemium> (prologue), <http://scta.info/resource/da-49-l1q1> (question I.1), and <http://scta.info/resource/da-49-l3q15> (question III.15).

2.3 Sigla and abbreviations

Sigla

O	Oxford, Oriel 33.
B	Oxford, Balliol 311.
Aguin.	Edition by Oyarzabal Aguinagalde.
⟨content⟩	The <i>content</i> is not part of the transmitted text, but I have supplied it as I deem it necessary for the text. In the translation, it represents content that I supply as an aid to the reader (although not required to the Latin text).
⌈content⌋	The <i>content</i> is not part of the transmitted text, but I have supplied it in place of a gap left by a scribe of one or more witnesses.
†content†	The <i>content</i> is part of the transmitted text, but it results in an incoherent text for which I have found no remedy.
[content]	The <i>content</i> is preserved in the transmitted text, but in my best judgement it does not belong in the text.
{content}	The <i>content</i> is not in the transmitted text, and I do not consider it necessary for the text, but I have supplied it as auxiliary meta-text for the modern reader.

Abbreviations

<i>corr.</i>	correxit.
<i>del.</i>	delevit.
<i>inv.</i>	invertit.
<i>nn litt.</i>	<i>nn</i> litterarum capax.
<i>om.</i>	omisit.
<i>ras.</i>	rasura.
<i>scr.</i>	scripsit vel scripsi.

<i>spat. vac.</i>	spatium vacuum.
<i>suppl.</i>	supplevit vel supplevi.
<i>transp.</i>	transposuit.

John Dinsdale

Quaestiones in De anima

{Prooemium}

BONORUM HONORABILIUM ET CETERA. Philosophus in secundo *Physicorum* volens investigare et ostendere terminos et limites considerationis physicae sive naturalis ait usquequo oportet physicum speciem et quod quid est considerare, id est usque ad quem terminum se extendit consideratio physica sive philosophi
 5 naturalis quam habet de speciebus, id est formis, quae sunt quod quid est, id est quae pertinent ad rationem quiditatis, et respondet ibidem dicens quemadmodum medicus considerat nervum et faber aes, considerat physicus formam sive speciem et quod quid est; quia non omnis consideratio nervi spectat ad medicum, nec quicquid potest considerari de aere pertinet ad fabrum, sic nec omnis con-
 10 sideratio de formis pertinet ad physicum. Advidendum igitur qualiter praedicti artifices considerant de praedictis.

O 164ra, B
148rb

Videndum est qualis sit consideratio medici et fabri et physici. Medicus autem intendit principaliter sanitatem facere, unde si de nervo considerat, hoc est ut in eo fiat sanitas, et ideo quaecumque consideratio de nervo, prout deservit san-
 15 nitati, pertinet ad medicum, si tamen sit aliqua consideratio transcendens istam, subterfugiet considerationem medici. Similiter, quia faber considerat de materia instrumentorum artificialium, quaecumque consideratio aeris, prout est materia instrumentorum artificialium, pertinet ad fabrum, si qua tamen sit consideratio

1 Arist. DA I.1 402a1. 3 Arist. Ph. II.2 194b10–11. 6–8 Arist. Ph. II.2 194b11–12.

1 bonorum honorabilium et cetera] *om.* O 2 et ostendere] *om.* B 3 naturalis] sic *add. et del.* B est] *iter.* B 4 physica sive philosophi] *om.* B 5–6 quam ... quiditatis] de formis quae pertinent ad quod quid est B 6 ibidem] *om.* B dicens] quod *add.* B 7 considerat²] ita *add.* B physicus] considerat *add.* B sive] et B 9 potest considerari] *inv.* B 10 igitur] ergo B igitur] praedicti *add. et del.* O qualiter] quaeri *a.c.* B 10–11 praedicti artifices] *inv.* B 12 sit] est *a.c.* B et¹] *om.* O et physici] *om.* B 12–13 autem] enim B 13 intendit principaliter] *inv.* B considerat] consideret B 14 fiat] inducatur B 15 tamen] autem B istam] de nervo B 16 subterfugiet] superfugiet B quia faber] vero faber quia *sed* quia *supra lin. scr.* B materia] rerum sive *add.* B 17 consideratio] est *add.* B 18 instrumentorum] vasorum B fabrum] eius considerationem B qua tamen sit] autem sit aliqua B consideratio] *om.* O

transcendens, declinat eius considerationem. Ex istis patet qualis sit consideratio physici et ad quem terminum se extendit. Quicquid enim a physico est consideratum, motui et transmutationi est coniunctum, quae enim non amplius mota movent non sunt physicae considerationis per Philosophum secundo *Physicorum*.

- 5 Formae igitur omnino immateriales non coniunctae materiae motui et transmutationi subiectae subterfugiunt considerationem physici sive naturalis, sed forma quae quodammodo est immaterialis et quodammodo perfectio materiae est de consideratione naturalis seu physici, et est illud ultimum in quod potest consideratio physica. Talis autem forma est anima humana, et ideo ipsa est terminus
10 et finis considerationis physicae.

Unde distinguere possumus quod tres sunt gradus formarum, quaedam enim sunt omnino immateriales, et secundum dispositionem et secundum substantiam, cuiusmodi sunt intelligentiae, quae sunt praeter omnem materiam sensibilem et intelligibilem per Philosophum octavo *Metaphysicae*; et quaedam sunt
15 penitus materiales, et secundum substantiam et secundum dispositionem, quia suae substantiae et suae dispositiones de materia sunt eductae, cuiusmodi sunt formae istorum inferiorum; sed quaedam sunt formae medio modo se habentes, quae secundum substantiam sunt immateriales et secundum dispositiones sunt materiales, cuiusmodi sunt animae humanae. Unde primae formae sunt praeter
20 considerationem physicam, sed a secundis formis incipit consideratio physica et terminatur ad tertiam, incipit enim consideratio physici a formis inferioribus et

3–4 Arist. *Ph.* II.7 198a26–30. 13–14 Arist. *Metaph.* VIII.5 1044b27–29(?), cf. VI.1 1026a10–18.

1 declinat] transfugiet B istis] hiis B patet] potest patere B 1–2 qualis ... extendit] ad quae extendit consideratio naturalis seu physici B 2–3 est consideratum] consideratur B 3 motui et transmutationi] motui B est coniunctum] subicitur B quae] quaecumque B enim] vero B 3–4 non amplius mota movent] non amplius movent mota O; movent non mota B 4 per philosophum] ut dicitur in B physicorum] et etiam in tertio eiusdem *add.* B 5 igitur] vero B materiae] nec subiectae sunt *add.* B et] nec B 6 subiectae] *om.* B subterfugiunt] superfigiunt B sive naturalis] *om.* O 8 seu physici] *om.* O illud] *om.* B 9 autem] *om.* B autem] est *add. et del.* O ipsa] *om.* B terminus] limes B 10 finis] terminus B physicae] naturalis B 11 possumus] *sup. lin.* O enim] *om.* B 12 omnino] penitus B dispositionem] suam substantiam B 12–13 substantiam] suam dispositionem B 13 intelligentiae] substantiae separatae B omnem materiam] *inv. a.c.* O 14 per philosophum] ut dicitur B sunt] formae *add.* B 16 suae substantiae] *om.* B suae dispositiones] eorum essentiae et potentiae B de materia] a potentiis materiae B cuiusmodi sunt] ut B 17 inferiorum] sensibilibus inferiorum B sed] *om.* B quaedam] vero *add.* B 18 secundum¹] suam *add.* B et] *om.* B secundum²] tamen *add.* B sunt²] *om.* B 19 cuiusmodi sunt] ut B 21 tertiam] formas ultimo dictas B consideratio physici] eius consideratio B inferioribus] ultimis B

terminatur ad animam humanam.

Ex istis patet ulterius quem ordinem habeat liber iste inter libros naturales, quia modus physicus et modus metaphysicus quodammodo sunt oppositi. Modus enim physicus habet statum in supremo sed non in infimo, habet enim statum
 5 quantum ad modum abstractionis, qui status est supremus, quia aliqua sunt ita abstracta quod excedunt considerationem physicam, et aliqua sunt ita abstracta quod ultra ea non se extendit consideratio physica, sed quantum ad modum con-
 cretionis, qui est modus infimus, non habet physicus statum, non enim est aliqua forma ita materiae concreta quod subterfugiat considerationem physici. Immo
 10 quanto forma magis est concreta materiae tanto magis cadit sub eius considera-
 tione, et hoc est intelligendum supposita abstractione a singularibus, si enim ad individua et numero singularia velimus considerare, hoc praetergreditur consi-
 derationem physicam. Sed modus metaphysicus se habet econtrario, quia statum habet in infimis sed non in supremo, quia aliqua forma est ita materiae concreta
 15 quod eius consideratio non pertineat ad metaphysicum, sed non est aliqua forma ita abstracta quod excedat considerationem metaphysicam, metaphysica enim est circa causas altissimas. Unde quanto consideratio est magis abstractorum, tanto magis metaphysicalis est. Hoc est intelligendum de consideratione per ar-
 tem humanam inventa, si qua enim sit consideratio abstracta per inspirationem
 20 acquisita, ipsa excedit considerationem metaphysici, sed talis non est praesentis speculationis.

B 148va

Sic igitur intelligenda sunt quae dicta sunt, quod cum tres sint partes es-
 sentiales philosophiae (scilicet naturalis, mathematica et divina) inter artes vel
 scientias per artem humanam inventas, metaphysicus non recognoscit aliquam
 25 scientiam superiorem, physica etiam inter partes philosophiae essentielles quan-

2 istis] hiis B istis] etiam *add.* B ulterius] *om.* B habeat] tenet B liber iste] *inv.* B
 4 non] habet statum *add.* B 5 qui status est supremus] *om.* B 7 ultra] ultimo B
 se extendit consideratio physica] considerat B 8 qui est modus infimus] *om.* B 9
 materiae ... physici] concreta quae superfugiat naturalis B 10 forma] *om.* O est] *om.*
 O concreta materiae] *inv.* B 10–11 cadit sub eius consideratione] sub eius consideratione
 cadit B 11 supposita] universalitate seu *add.* B 12 velimus considerare] consideramus B
 praetergreditur] extendit B 13 se habet] est B quia statum] statum enim B 14 non]
 ad hunc *a.c. vel fortasse in* habet *corr.* B non] statum *add.* B 15 eius consideratio] *om.* B
 pertineat] pertinet B 16 quod excedat] qua non pertineat ad B metaphysicam, metaphysica
 enim] quia B 18 metaphysicalis est] est metaphysica et B intelligendum] est *add.* B 19
 qua] *om.* B enim] autem B sit] aliqua *add.* B abstracta] *om.* B inspirationem]
 aspirationem B 20 ipsa] *om.* B 20–21 sed ... speculationis] *om.* B 22 igitur] ergo B 22–23
 essentielles philosophiae] *inv.* B 23 artes vel] *om.* B 24 metaphysicus] metaphysica B

tum ad modum abstractionis non recognoscit aliquem artificem inferiorem – licet
superiorem, sed mathematicus recognoscit et artificem superiorem, quia aliquis
est qui magis abstrahit, et inferiorem, quia aliquis est qui magis concernit. Unde,
ut dictum est, consideratio physici incipit a formis infimis et terminatur ad ani-
mam humanam, et ex hoc patet quod liber de anima sextum gradum tenet inter
libros naturales, quia primum gradum tenet liber *Physicorum*, secundum liber
De caelo et mundo, tertium liber *De generatione et corruptione*, quartum gradum
tenet liber *Meteororum*, quintum liber *De mineralibus*, sextum liber *De anima*.
Unde primus est iste liber dignitate, licet ultimus sive sextus ordine doctrinae,
et ideo Philosophus considerans eius dignitatem dicit quod historia de anima in
primis est ponenda.

10–11 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a1–7.

1 aliquem artificem] aliquam scientiam B 1–2 licet superiorem] sed superiorem recognos-
centem recognoscit B 2 sed] *om.* B mathematicus] mathematica B 2–3 artificem ...
abstrahit] superiorem B 3 aliquis est qui] aliqua est quae magis abstrahit et aliqua quae B 4
physici] physica B 5 humanam, et] *om.* B sextum gradum tenet] tenet sextum gradum
B 6 physicorum] qui est de naturali audito *add.* B secundum] tenet *add.* B 7 tertium]
gradum tenet *add.* B liber] *sup. lin.* O *et corruptione]* *om.* B 8 quintum] gradum tenet
add. B *mineralibus]* mineris B O sextum] gradum tenet *add.* B 9 unde ... liber] qui
prior est B licet ultimus sive] *om.* B sextus] tamen *add.* B 10 et ideo] unde B con-
siderans eius dignitatem] in prohemio huius primi B 10–11 in primis] primo B 11 ponenda]
scilicet dignitate *add.* B

LIBER PRIMUS

{*Quaestio 1: Utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia*}

Item quaeratur primo utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia.

B 148va, O
164rb

{1} Videtur quod non.

{1.1} Illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile, quia cum scientia sit habitus intellectus, de quo est scientia oportet esse intelligibile; sed anima non est intelligibile, quia omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu, unde ipsum intelligere non est sine phantasmate, sed anima sub sensu non cadit, nec phantasma facit; ergo et cetera.

{1.2} Praeterea, unum et idem non potest esse simul movens et motum, quia sic idem esset actu et potentia respectu eiusdem; sed cognitum est movens respectu cognocentis; ergo unum et idem non potest esse cognoscens et cognitum, hoc tamen contingeret si de anima esset scientia.

{1.3} Praeterea, sicut oculus nycticoracis \lceil se habet \rceil ad lumen solis, sic intellectus noster ad ea quae sunt manifestissima in natura, de quorum numero est anima, saltem humana; sed oculus nycticoracis non potest apprehendere lumen solis; ergo et cetera.

{1.4} Praeterea, nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore; sed anima, cum sit indivisibilis et perpetua, nec est continua nec temporalis; ergo et cetera.

{2} Oppositum patet per determinationem Philosophi.

{3.1} Dicendum quod cum scientia sit habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem, et ad demonstrationem tria requirantur (scilicet subiectum, passio, et principium per quod ostenditur passio de subiecto), ubi est invenire ista tria, ibi contingit ponere scientiam. Nunc autem anima quoddam subiectum est cuius sunt multae proprietates et passionem, ut patebit inferius. Sunt etiam principia

12–13 Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* II.1 993b9–11 ($\nu\upsilon\kappa\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\varsigma$).

1 item] *om.* B quaeratur] nunc *add.* B 5–6 unde ... est] quia nihil intelligimus B 8 quia] si *add.* B 9 idem esset] *inv.* B 10 cognoscens] movens B cognitum] motum sed B cognitum] sed *add.* B 11 esset scientia] cognitionem haberemus B 12 nycticoracis] vesperilionis O se habet] *spat. vac. 8 litt.* B; *om.* O 14 saltim] *om.* B 18 determinationem philosophi] Philosophum B 20 scilicet] *om.* B 21 invenire ista tria] ista tria invenire B 22 contingit ponere scientiam] est scientiam ponere B quoddam subiectum est] est quoddam ens B 23 multae] *om.* B

per quae istae passiones probari possunt de anima. Si enim accipiat quod quid est animae pro medio, per ipsum concludi potest propria passio eius de anima, et ita de anima potest aliquid sciri sive esse aliqualis scientia.

{3.2} Praeterea, accidentia non sunt per se entia, sed in alio. Qui ergo cognoscit accidentia, manuduci potest in cognitionem eius cuius sunt. Nunc autem multa accidentia ipsius animae nobis sunt manifesta: Operationes enim artificiales nobis notae sunt, quae tamen non fiunt absque intelligere, et intelligere procedit ab aliqua potentia, et potentia fluit ab essentia; et sic est de aliis operationibus quae procedunt ab irascibili. Unde per multa quae nobis nota sunt devenire possumus in cognitionem animae. Quia tamen scire est causam rei cognoscere, et talis cognitio de anima procedit per effectus et non per causam, ideo Philosophus talem cognitionem tradens de anima istam cognitionem nominat “historiam”. Extensive tamen dici potest scientia.

{Ad 1.1} Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod minor est falsa. Et ad probationem dicendum quod aliquid cadit | in sensu dupliciter: aut per positionem aut per privationem. Per privationem sicut tenebra et indivisibilia, ut punctum et unitas. Per positionem contingit dupliciter, aut per speciem sui, aut per speciem alterius; per speciem sui sicut color videtur, per speciem alterius sicut videtur Diari filius. Unde, licet anima non cadat sub sensu per se, cadit tamen sub sensu per alterum, ut per sui effectus, et eodem modo, licet per se phantasma non faciat, aliud tamen phantasma facit, quod in eius cognitionem ducere potest. B 148vb

{Ad 1.2} Ad aliud dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur motus: uno modo est actus imperfecti, et sic definitur a Philosopho in tertio *Physicorum*; alio modo est actus perfecti; sic intelligere et cognoscere dicuntur motus: Primo modo non potest idem esse movens et motum per se, per accidens tamen nihil prohibet,

13 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a4. 18–19 Arist. *DA* II.6 418a20–22. 23 Arist. *Phys.* III.2 201b31–33.

1 istae passiones probari possunt] ostendi possunt istae passiones B 2 per ipsum] *om.* B 3 aliquid sciri sive] *om.* B 4 per se entia] entia per se B 6 enim] *om.* B 7 tamen] *om.* B 8 fluit] *om.* B et² ... aliis] eodem modo est de B 9 quae nobis nota sunt] nobis B 10 possumus] possunt B causam rei] per causam O 11 cognitio de anima] *om.* B et²] *om.* B 12 istam cognitionem nominat] ipsam vocat B 14 quod minor est falsa] per interemptionem minoris B et] *om.* B 15 aliquid] aliquod B 16 per¹] *om.* O 18 sicut¹] ut B sicut²] ut B 19 videtur] *om.* B se] rei B cadit] cadat B O 20 et] *om.* B 21 aliud] aliquid O B 22 aliud] secundum B dupliciter dicitur motus] motus dicitur dupliciter B 23 et sic] sicut B a philosopho in] *om.* B 24 sic] sicut B cognoscere] sentire O

sicut nauta movet navem per se, qua mota movet seipsum. Secundo modo nihil prohibet idem movere se ipsum. Sed tamen differentia est: aliqua enim est substantia semper actu intelligens, et talis substantia potest intelligere se per se, sicut est de prima causa et intelligentiis; sed aliqua est non semper actu intelligens, sicut est anima humana, et talis substantia non intelligit se per se, quia nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod actu est, et talis substantia, cum sit in potentia intelligens non est in actu nisi per alterum, ut per speciem intelligibilem, ideo per alterum potest se intelligere. Per hoc enim quod anima intelligit obiectum per speciem potest intelligere suum actum, et per actum potest reflectere se supra suam essentiam; unde anima nostra quodammodo intelligit se sicut nauta movet navem.

{Ad 1.3} Ad aliud dicendum quod licet oculus nycticoracis non possit apprehendere directe lumen solis, potest tamen indirecte aliquam claritatem apprehendere, et si visus eius esset discursivus, posset cognoscere lumen solis. Nunc autem, etsi intellectus noster non potest in cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, tamen aliqui effectus earum apparent nobis, per quos manuducimur in earum notitiam, et quia intellectus noster est discursivus, ideo potest in aliqualem cognitionem earum ut per effectus. Magis | tamen cognoscimus de anima quam de substantiis separatis, quia effectus ipsius animae nobis apparentes magis adaequant virtutem eius quam effectus substantiarum separatarum nobis apparentes adaequant virtutem earum. O 164va

{Ad 1.4} Ad aliud dicendum quod intelligere nostrum non est sine continuo et tempore, quia non est sine phantasmate. Non tamen oportet omne intelligere esse continuum et temporale.

1 movet navem per se] per se *ante* movet navem *scr.* B qua mota movet seipsum] et motu navi movetur per accidens B 2 movere se ipsum] esse movens et motum respectu sui ipsius B enim] *om.* B 3 substantia²] *om.* O 4 sicut ... intelligentiis] sed est de prima causa et intelligentiis O; *om.* B est] substantia *add.* B 5 sicut est anima humana] *om.* B substantia] *om.* O non intelligit] non potest intelligere B 7-8 non ... ideo] per speciem alterius B 8 se] seipsum B 9 se] *om.* B 10-11 unde ... navem] *om.* B 12 aliud] tertium B 13-14 potest ... apprehendere] aliquem tamen effectum eius potest apprehendere B 14 eius] *om.* B posset] possit B cognoscere] intelligere B 15 autem, etsi] *om.* B noster] etsi *add. et del.* O potest] posset O; possit B potest] directe *add.* B perfectam] *om.* B 16-17 aliqui ... notitiam] potest in effectus earum B; per ... notitiam *in marg.* O 17 potest] per effectus possumus B 18 aliqualem] aliquid O earum ut per effectus] substantiarum separatarum B 19 substantiis] aliis O ipsius] *om.* B 19-20 nobis apparentes] *om.* B 20 effectus] quae *add.* O 21 nobis apparentes] *om.* B adaequant virtutem earum] *om.* O 22 intelligere nostrum] *inv.* B sine] phantasmate *add.* B 23 oportet] quod *add.* B 23-24 intelligere esse] quod a nobis est quocumque modo intelligibile sit B 24 temporale] temporalis B

LIBER TERTIUS

{Quaestio 15: Utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit alia}

Supposito nunc quod intelligat se per suam essentiam. Quaeritur utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit alia. B 174va

{1} Quod per suam essentiam videtur.

{1.1} Quia quae intelliguntur ab intellectu intelliguntur per aliud quam
5 per suam essentiam, ut per speciem; sed intelligibile, inquantum intelligibile, est unum specie; si ergo intellectus esset intelligibilis per aliud sicut et alia, cum intellectus, praeter hoc quod est intelligibilis, intelligit, et omnia alia, praeter hoc quod sunt intelligibilia, intellige(re)nt.

{1.2} Praeterea, in separatis a materia idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur; sed intellectus separatus est a materia; ergo idem est in ipso intelligens et intellectum, ergo per suam essentiam intelligit seipsum.

{1.3} Praeterea, intelligentia et intellectus humanus conveniunt in genere intelligibilium; sed intelligentia intelligit se per suam essentiam; ergo intellectus humanus.

{1.4} Praeterea, actio intelligendi provenit ex unione intelligibilis cum intellectu; sed nihil magis unitur intellectui quam ipse sibi; ergo non potest intelligere per aliud quam per se.

{1.5} Praeterea, intellectus intelligit se: aut ergo per suam essentiam aut per speciem aut per suum actum; sed nec per speciem | nec per suum actum; B 174vb
20 ergo per suam essentiam. Probatio assumpti: Nec per speciem, quia intelligibilis abstracta est a phantasmatis, et intellectus phantasma non facit; nec per actum, quia si actum suum intelligeret, aliquo actu ipsum intelligeret. Illum ergo actum aut intelliget aut non. Si non, eadem ratione nec primum, si sic, ergo alio actu,

1 nunc] *om.* Aguin. quod] substantiae separatae *suppl.* Aguin. intelligat] intelligent Aguin. 5 intelligibile¹] numquam *suppl.* Aguin. 6 intelligibilis] intelligibile Aguin. 7 praeter¹] propter Aguin. praeter²] propter Aguin. 8 intelligibilia] intelligentia Aguin. intelligere] intelligent B; intelligens Aguin. 16 intellectui] intel *cum ras. 3 litt.* B; *om.* Aguin. 18 aut¹] aliter Aguin. aut²] aliter Aguin. 19 aut] aliter Aguin. nec¹] non Aguin. 20 probatio assumpti] Probo ad formam argumenti Aguin. speciem] species Aguin. 22 aliquo] altero Aguin. illum] alium Aguin. 23 aut¹] aliter Aguin. aut²] aliter Aguin. nec] non Aguin.

et ita erit procedere in infinitum. Praeterea sensus particularis non sentit suum actum, ergo nec intellectus intelligit suum actum.

{2} Oppositum dicit Philosophus in tertio *De anima*. Dicit enim quod “intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia”; sed alia non intelligit per suas essentias,
5 sed per suas species; ergo eodem modo intelligit se.

{3.1} Dicendum est quod intellectus non intelligit se per suam essentiam, et huius ratio est: Nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod actu est, unde nihil est verum quod sub cognitione intellectus cadit, nisi secundum quod est actu, per Philosophum in nono *Metaphysicae*. Immo, sicut visus non videt vel non cognoscit coloratum in potentia, sed coloratum in actu, sic nec intellectus intelligit,
10 et ideo, quia materia est ens in potentia, materiam non cognoscit nisi per formam per quam est in actu. Sed intellectus humanus secundum se non est in actu. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquis est intellectus qui est actus purus et perfectus, ut intellectus Dei, et ipse cognoscit se vel intelligit per
15 suam essentiam et omnia alia per se; alius est intellectus qui est in actu sed non est actus perfectus, ut intellectus intelligentiae, quia ipse intelligit se per suam essentiam, alia tamen non intelligit per se, sed per eorum similitudines. Sed intellectus humanus non est in actu secundum se, et propter hoc vocatur possibilis, quia secundum se in potentia est, et ideo ex se non habet quod intelligatur. Ex se
20 tamen habet quod intelligat; immo, sicut Plato posuit intelligibilia entia separata et intellectum nostrum intelligibilem secundum quod participat ipsa intelligibilia, sic, cum Philosophus ponit species abstractas a phantasmatibus intelligibiles, habet ponere intellectum nostrum intelligibilem secundum quod istas species participat, et hoc sic: Secundum quod intellectus noster intelligit obiectum per
25 speciem potest redire super suum actum, et ab actu potest procedere ad suam potentiam, et a potentia ad essentiam, et ita per hoc quod actu est per speciem alterius potest suum actum intelligere et per actum seipsum. Unde illud quod primo intelligitur ex parte intellectus est eius actus, qui est ultima eius perfec-

3–4 Arist. *DA*, III.4 430a2 9–10 Arist. *Metaph.*, IX.9 1051a29–31, cf. *Auct. Arist.* (ed. Hamesse), 6.234. 20–22 Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I q. 87, a. 1, resp. p. 429a. 22 *De anima* III.7 431b2–3, cf. Aquinas, *Sent. de anima* lib. 3, cap. 7, p. 236, ll. 72–89; lib. 3, cap. 4, p. 218, ll. 8–23 and p. 220, ll. 101–121; id. *ST* q. 84, a. 7, resp., p. 414b.

1 ita erit] cetera Aguin. particularis] particulares Aguin. sentit] sentiunt Aguin. 4 intelligit¹] speciem *add. et del.* B suas essentias] suam essentiam Aguin. 9 nono] noveno Aguin. 10 sed coloratum in actu] *om.* Aguin. 11 materiam] in materia B; tunc materiam Aguin. 14 dei] divinus Aguin. 24 sic] ergo Aguin. 25 redire super suum actum] super suum actum redire Aguin. 27 illud] id Aguin.

tio. Quia intelligere non est operatio transiens in extrinsecum sicut calefacere vel aedificare, sed manens in operante, ideo intelligere non est perfectio alicuius extrinseci sicut aedificare, sed est perfectio ipsius intellectus.

{3.2} Sed istum actum potest intelligere dupliciter. Uno modo in particulari, ut cum actu percipit se intelligere, et alio modo in universali, ut cum per
5 obiectum investigat propriam eius operationem. Et eodem modo per actum potest intelligere suam essentiam dupliciter: Uno modo in particulari, ut cum intelligit quod habet, ut cum Socrates percipit se habere intellectum per hoc quod actu intelligit, et alio modo in universali, ut cum inquit naturam intellectus per
10 suam operationem. Et isti modi differunt, quia ad primam cognitionem sufficit praesentia intellectus actu operantis, sed ad secundam cognitionem requiritur subtilis et diligens inquisitio, et ideo multi naturam intellectus ignoraverunt et multi circa ipsam erraverunt.

{Ad 1.1} Ad primum argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus et intellectum in actu sunt idem, et non intellectus et intellectum in potentia. Modo
15 species intelligibilis est immediatum principium intelligendi. Unde in quocumque est species actu intelligibilis, illud potest intelligere, sed quaecumque species est in lapide vel in re materiali extra intellectum, solum est intelligibilis in potentia, et ideo nullum intelligibile extra intellectum nostrum habet in se immediatum
20 principium intelligendi, et propter hoc non potest intelligere. Sed species quae est in intellectu, intelligibilis actu est, | et ideo, cum intellectus noster habeat in se immediatum principium intelligendi, potest intelligere praeter hoc quod intelligibilis est, et ita non est in aliis.

B 175ra

{Ad 1.2} Ad secundum argumentum dicendum est quod ista dicuntur separata a materia quae sunt actu intellecta, unde Philosophus dicit in tertio *De anima* quod omnino sicut res sunt separabiles a materia sic sunt circa intellectum. Sed intellectum in actu et intellectus sunt idem, sicut sensibile in actu et
25 sensus; sensibile vero in actu et sensus non sunt idem nisi quia eadem est forma utriusque, quia species quae causata est a sensibili <ut> ab agente est in sensu ut in subiecto, et eodem modo in proposito: Intellectum in actu et intellectus
30 dicuntur idem, quia species intellecti in actu est forma perficiens et informans

25–27 Arist. *De anima* III.4 429b21–2.

8 ut] vel B Aguin. 13 circa] essentiam Aguin. 19 nostrum] minime Aguin. 21 noster habeat] apprehendat Aguin. 22 praeter] per Aguin. 23 in] de Aguin. 26 omnino] omnia Aguin. 28 vero] veri Aguin. 29 quae] q cum ras. 2 litt. B; ut Aguin. 30–31 in² ... idem] om. Aguin.

intellectum, et per istam formam intelligit intellectus se discurrendo et non per suam essentiam.

{Ad 1.3} Ad tertium argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus intelligentiae est actus perfectus, quia semper actu est. Habet enim in se species innatas.
 5 Sed intellectus noster secundum se est in potentia ut possibilis, et ipse intellectus agens, etsi sit actus, est actus intelligibilium, et non intellectus, antequam intelligat.

{Ad 1.4} Ad quartum dicendum est quod actio intelligendi causatur ex unione obiecti cum intellectu, sed licet nihil magis uniatur intellectui quam ipse
 10 sibi, non tamen uniatur sibi ut obiectum, quia obiectum intellectus nostri est natura rei quae est extra animam, et ipsa non unitur intellectui nisi per speciem.

{Ad 1.5} Ad ultimum argumentum dicendum est quod intelligit se et per speciem et per actum, sed non per speciem propriam, ut ratio probat, sed per speciem quae alterius est. Similiter per actum suum intelligit se, et illum actum
 15 adhuc intelligit alio actu. Propter quod intelligendum est quod aliquis est intellectus qui est suum intelligere, et ideo unico actu intelligit suam essentiam et suum intelligere, quia idem sunt, ut intellectus Dei. Et alius est intellectus qui non est suum intelligere, sua tamen essentia est obiectum sui intelligere, ut intellectus intelligentiae, et licet suum intelligere et sua essentia differant, tamen
 20 unico actu intelligit suam essentiam et suum intelligere, quia intelligere est perfectio suae essentiae, et unico actu intelligitur res et sua perfectio. Sed intellectus humanus nec est suum intelligere, nec sua essentia est obiectum sui intelligere, sed obiectum eius est res extra intellectum, et ideo unico actu non potest intelligere obiectum et suum intelligere, quia suum intelligere non est perfectio obiecti.
 25 Intelligere enim lapidem non est perfectio lapidis, sed est perfectio intellectus, et ideo unico actu non contingit intelligere lapidem et ipsum intelligere. Unde per hoc dicendum est ad argumentum quod alio actu intelligit suum actum et suum obiectum, et actu intelligit illum actum, et sic in infinitum, nec est inconveniens procedere in infinitum in actibus intellectus et rationis.

30 Ad aliam probationem dicendum est quod sensus sentit per immutationem organi corporalis, et nihil corporale mutat seipsum, et ideo sensus non immutatur nisi ab extrinseco. Sed intellectus non immutatur per immutationem organi corporalis, sed spiritualiter, et spirituale bene potest reflectere se supra se, et ideo

1 se] sed a.c. B 5 ut] vel Aguin. 8 quartum] argumentum *suppl.* Aguin. 9 quam] quod B Aguin. 14 similiter] Simul Aguin. illum] ullum Aguin. 17 dei] divinus Aguin. 18 est²] om. Aguin. 26 contingit] convenit Aguin.

posuit Plato primum movens movere seipsum quia primum movens posuit esse animam et operationes eius, sicut amare et gaudere et huiusmodi, posuit esse motum eius.

3 Translation

John Dinsdale

Questions on De anima

Prologue

OF GOOD AND HONOURABLE THINGS ET CETERA. In the second book of *Physics*, as he intends to investigate and present the boundaries and limits of the study of physics and of the natural philosopher, the Philosopher says to which extent the natural philosopher ought to investigate the species and essence, viz. what the
 5 limits are of the study of physics or of the natural philosopher concerning species, i.e. forms, which are the essences, i.e. which are relevant to the definition of the essence. He answers in the same passage that just as the doctor investigates nerves and the smith metal, so the natural philosopher investigates the form or species and essence,. For not just any consideration of nerves pertains to the
 10 doctor, nor does whatever thing that can be known about metal pertain to the smith, and similarly not every consideration of forms pertains to the natural philosopher. We must therefore consider how these artificers investigate the mentioned subjects.

Let us consider what the different subject matters of the doctor, the smith and
 15 the natural philosopher are. A doctor primarily seeks to produce good health in them, so when he investigates nerves, it aims at the production of good health; therefore every investigation of nerves pertains to the doctor, insofar as it strives for good health, but if there is some other consideration that goes beyond this, it supersedes the doctor's investigation. Similarly, as the smith focuses on matter
 20 of artificial instruments, any investigation of metal, qua the matter of artificial instruments, pertains to the smith, but if there is some consideration that goes beyond this, it stays beyond his purview. From this it is apparent of what sort of object the natural philosopher's knowledge is and to which limit it extends. For whatever is considered by a natural philosopher is characterized by movement
 25 and change, for things which move but are not moved do not fall within the natural philosopher's purview according to the Philosopher in *Physics* II. Hence

1 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a1. 3–4 Arist. *Ph.* II.2 194b10–11. 7–9 Arist. *Ph.* II.2 194b11–12. 25–26 Arist. *Ph.* II.7 198a26–30.

entirely immaterial forms which are not linked to matter which is subject to motion and change, escape the purview of the physicist or natural philosopher. But forms which in one way are immaterial and in another way are the perfection of matter do fall within the purview of the natural philosopher or physicist, and that is the limit to which the physical study extends. But the human soul is that sort of form, and hence it is the limit and end of physical study.

And from this we can establish that there are three types of forms. For some are entirely immaterial, both with respect to their disposition and substance, and such are the intelligences, which exist without any sensible or intelligible matter according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VIII. Some are entirely material, both with respect to their substance and disposition, since their substances and dispositions are drawn from matter, and the forms of the things here below are of this sort. But some are forms of a medial character which are immaterial with respect to their substance and material with respect to their dispositions, and the human souls are of this sort. Hence the first forms are beyond the purview of the natural philosopher, but the physical study begins with the second forms and terminates with the third, for the study of the natural philosopher begins with the lower forms and ends with the human soul.

From this it is furthermore clear which place this book holds among the books on natural philosophy, as the physical and the metaphysical mode of investigation in some way are opposed each other. For the natural philosopher's mode of investigation has an upper limit but not a lower one, for it has a limit with regard to the level of abstraction, which is the upper limit, since some things are so abstract that they are beyond physical study, and some are so abstract that physical study does not go beyond them. But with regard to the level of concreteness, which is the lower level, the natural philosopher does not have a limit, for there is no form so concreted with matter it falls outside the natural philosopher's subject matter. Thus the more concreted a form is with matter, the more it falls within his subject matter, and this must be understood in such a way that the abstraction from singular items is presupposed, for if we look to things individual and numerically singular, they fall outside of the natural philosopher's subject matter. But the contrary holds for the metaphysician's mode of investigation, since it has a lower limit but not an upper one, because some forms are so concrete with respect to matter that the consideration of them does not pertain to the metaphysician, but there is no form so abstract that it exceeds the

10 Arist. *Metaph.* VIII.5 1044b27–29(?).

metaphysician's consideration, for metaphysics is concerned with the highest causes. Hence the more an investigation is concerned with abstract things, the more metaphysical it is. This must be understood with reference to a study based on human inquiry, for if there is some abstract study which is acquired through
 5 inspiration, it exceeds the metaphysician's subject matter, but that sort of consideration is not within the purview of the present investigation.

Hence let us understand what has been said in the following way, that when there are three essential parts of philosophy (namely natural philosophy, mathematics, and divine science) among the arts or sciences found through human
 10 inquiry, the metaphysician does not recognize any higher science, but in terms of the level of abstraction natural philosophy does not recognize any lower practitioner within the essential parts of philosophy, although there is a higher one, but the mathematician recognizes both a higher practice, since there is a more abstract one, and a lower, since there is one more concrete. Hence, as it has been
 15 said, the natural philosopher's subject matter takes its beginning with the lower forms and ends with the human soul, and from this it is clear that *On the soul* holds the sixth place within the books on natural philosophy, for *Physics* holds the first place, *On the heavens and earth* the second, *On generation and corruption* the third, *Meteorology* the fourth, *On minerals* the fifth, and *On the soul* the sixth.
 20 It is therefore the first in order of dignity, although it is the last or sixth in the order of teaching, and hence the Philosopher says, with a view to its dignity, that the description of the soul should be ranked among the first sciences.

BOOK ONE

Question 1: Whether scientific knowledge about the soul can be acquired by us

First we must ask whether whether scientific knowledge about the soul can be acquired by us.

{1} It seems that it cannot.

{1.1} That about which there is scientific knowledge is intelligible, since, as
 5 scientific knowledge is a state of the intellect, the object of knowledge ought to be intelligible; but the soul is not something intelligible, since all our knowledge has its origin in the senses, and understanding as such does not take place without phantasms, but the soul is not available to sense perception, nor does it produce a phantasm; ergo et cetera.

10 {1.2} Furthermore, one and the same thing cannot be moving and moved at the same time, since then the same thing would be in act and potency with respect to the same; but that which is known is moving with respect to that which knows; ergo one and the same thing cannot be knowing and known, but that would be the case if there were scientific knowledge about the soul.

15 {1.3} Furthermore, just as the eye of the night-raven stands to the light of the sun, so our intellect stands to those things which are most clear in nature, to which the soul belongs, at least the human soul; but the eye of the night-raven cannot apprehend the light of the sun; ergo et cetera.

{1.4} Furthermore, our intellection is continuous and temporal; but the
 20 soul, since it is indivisible and perpetual, is neither continuous nor temporal; ergo et cetera.

{2} The opposite is clear from the Philosopher's determination.

{3.1} It must be said that since scientific knowledge is a state acquired by demonstration, and three elements are required for a demonstration (that is, a
 25 subject, an attribute, and a principle by which the attribute is ascribed to the subject), where these three can be found it can be said that there is a science. But now the soul is some sort of subject which has several properties and attributes, as will be apparent below. There are also some principles by which these

15–16 Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* II.1 993b9–11 (νυκτερίς).

attributes can be proved to belong to the soul. For if the definition of the soul is accepted as the middle term, by that a proper attribute of the soul can be concluded to belong to the soul, and in this way something can be known about the soul or there can be some sort of science about the soul.

- 5 {3.2} Furthermore, accidents are not things by themselves but belong to something else. Therefore one who knows the accidents can be led to a knowledge about that to which they belong. But now many accidents that belong to the soul itself are obvious to us: For productive activities are known to us, but they cannot take place without intellection, and intellection proceeds from some
10 sort of power, and a power flows from the essence; and it is the same with other activities <such as those> which proceed from the irascible part. Thus, by many things which are known to us we may arrive at a knowledge about the soul. But since knowing is knowing through causes, and such knowledge about the soul proceeds by effects, not by causes, the Philosopher, as he presents the knowledge
15 about the soul, calls the knowledge “an account”. But by extension it can be called a science.

- {Ad 1.1} To the first argument it must be said that the minor premise is false. And to the supporting argument it must be said that something is available to sense perception in two ways: either positively or privatively. Privatively like
20 shadows and indivisible objects, such as a point or a unity. Positively in two ways: either by its own species or by the species of something else; by its own species, as when a colour is seen, by the species of something else, as when the son of Diaries is seen.. Hence although the soul is not available to sense perception in itself, it is still available to sense perception through something else, namely
25 through its effects, and in the same way, although it does not produce a phantasm on its own, it produces another phantasm, which may lead to knowledge about it.

- {Ad 1.2} To the next argument it must be said that movement is said in two ways: in one way it is the act of something imperfect, as it is defined by
30 the Philosopher in the third book of the *Physics*, and in another way it is the act of something perfect, and in this way intellection and cognition are said to be movements. In the first way the same thing cannot be moving and moved by itself, but accidentally nothing prevents this, just as the sailor moves the ship by himself, and insofar as the ship is moved he moves himself. In the second

15 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a4. 22–23 Arist. *DA* II.6 418a20–22. 30 Arist. *Phys.* III.2 201b31–33.

way nothing prevents the same thing from moving itself. There is however a difference: For there is one sort of substance which always actively knows, and such a substance can know by itself, as it is the case with the first cause and the intelligences; but there is another sort of substance, such as the human soul,
 5 which does not always actively know, and such a thing does not know by itself, since it knows nothing except when it is actualized, and such a substance, since it potentially knows, does not actually do so except by means of something else, that is by means of an intelligible species, and therefore it can know itself through something else. For by the fact that the soul knows an object by a species it can
 10 know its own activity, and by the activity it can reflect itself on its own essence; hence our soul in a certain way knows itself the way a sailor moves his ship.

{Ad 1.3} To the next argument it must be said that although the eye of the night-raven cannot apprehend the light of the sun directly, it can nevertheless apprehend some brightness indirectly, and if its sight were discursive, then it
 15 could know the light of the sun. But now, although our intellect cannot arrive at a perfect knowledge about the separate substances, some of their effects are still apparent to us by which we are led to a knowledge about them, and since our intellect is discursive, it can arrive at some sort of knowledge of them through their effects. But we know more about the soul than about the separate substan-
 20 ces, because those effects of the soul that are apparent to us, are more on the level of its power than the effects of the separate substances, that are apparent to us, are on the level of their power.

{Ad 1.4} To the next argument it must be said that our intellection does not take place without continuity and time, since it does not take place without
 25 a phantasm. But it is not required that all intellection be continuous and temporal.

BOOK THREE

Question 15: Whether the intellect knows itself by its essence or through something else just as it knows other things

It is asked whether the intellect knows itself by its essence or through something else just as it knows other things.

{1} It seems that it <knows itself> through its essence.

{1.1} Because things that are known through the intellect are known through something other than their essence, namely their species; but what is intelligible, insofar as it is intelligible, is one in species; thus if the intellect were intelligible through something else just as other things are, and when the intellect, besides being intelligible, knows, then all other things, besides being intelligible, would also know.

{1.2} Furthermore, in beings that are separate from matter that which knows and that which is known are identical; but the intellect is separate from matter; thus in the intellect what knows and what is known are identical, thus it knows itself through itself.

{1.3} Furthermore, intelligence and human intellect agree in the genus of intelligible objects; but an intelligence knows itself through its essence; hence the human intellect <does too>.

{1.4} Furthermore, the act of knowing arises from the unity of the intelligible and the intellect; but nothing is more united with the intellect than the intellect with itself; thus it cannot know <itself> through anything but itself.

{1.5} Furthermore, the intellect knows itself. Thus it either does so through its own essence, through a species, or through its activity; but it does so neither through a species nor through its own activity; hence it must do so through its own essence. Proof of the assumption: Neither through a species, since an intelligible species is abstracted from phantasms, and the intellect does not produce any phantasm; nor through its activity, since if it knew its activity, it would know itself through some other activity. But then it will either know that activity or not know it. If it does not know it, the same would hold for the first activity, if it does know it, then it will be through another activity, and in this way it will be possible to proceed to infinity. Furthermore, a particular sense does not sense its activity, thus neither does the intellect know its activity.

{2} The Philosopher says the opposite in the third book of *De anima*. For he says that “the intellect knows itself just like other things”; but it does not know other things through their essences but through their species; hence ⟨the intellect⟩ knows itself in the same way.

- 5 {3.1} It must be said that the intellect does not know itself through its essence, and the reason for that is: Nothing is known except insofar as it actually is, hence nothing that is available to the cognition of the intellect is true, except in accordance with its actuality, as the Philosopher says in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*. Indeed, just as sight does not see nor know something potentially
 10 coloured but something actually coloured, so the intellect does not know, and therefore, since matter is being in potentiality, the intellect does not know it except through the form through which it is actualized. To better see this it must taken into consideration that there is an intellect which is pure and perfect actuality, such as the intellect of God, and it cognizes itself and knows ⟨itself⟩ through
 15 its essence and all other things through itself; there is another intellect which is in actuality but is not perfect act, such as the intellect of an intelligence, since it knows itself through its essence, but it does not know other things through itself but through their similitudes. But the human intellect is not in actuality through itself, and is therefore called possible, since through itself it is in potentiality, and is therefore not itself that by which it is known. But it is itself that by
 20 which it knows; indeed just as Plato held that intelligible objects are separate and that our intellect is intelligible through its participation in those intelligible objects, so the Philosopher, when he says that species are abstracted from intelligible phantasms, is bound to say that our intellect is intelligible according to
 25 its participation in those species, and he does this in the following way: Since our intellect knows an object through its species, it is able to revert on its own activity, and from the activity it can proceed to its power, and from the power to the essence, and thus by being actualized by another species it can know its own activity, and by the activity ⟨it can know⟩ itself. Hence what is first known as
 30 concerns the intellect is its actuality, which is its final perfection. Since knowing is not an activity that has an effect outside itself, such as heating and building do, but rather remains in the operating subject, knowing is not a perfection of

2 Arist. *DA*, III.4 430a2. 9–10 Arist. *Metaph.*, IX.9 1051a29–31, cf. *Auct. Arist.* (ed. Hamesse), 6.234. 21–23 23–24 *De anima* III.8 432a8–9 cf. Aquinas, *Sent. de anima* lib. 3, cap. 7, p. 236, ll. 72–89. See also *ibid.* lib. 3, cap. 4, p. 218, ll. 8–23 and p. 220, ll. 101–121; id. *ST* q. 84, a. 7.

some external thing as is building, but is the perfection of the intellect itself.

{3.2} But this activity it can understand in two ways. In one way in the particular, such as when it perceives that it is itself actually knowing, and in another way in the universal, such as when it investigates its own particular
 5 function through its object. And in the same way it can know its own essence through its activity in two ways: In one way as a particular, such as when it knows that which it has, such as when Socrates perceives that he has an intellect by the fact that he knows in actuality, and in another way as a universal, such as
 10 when it inquires about the nature of the intellect through its function. And these ways differ, since the presence of the intellect that is actualized in an activity suffices for the first cognition, but for the second cognition a subtle and diligent inquiry is required, and for this reason many have been ignorant of the nature of the intellect and many have gone wrong about it.

{Ad 1.1} To the first argument it must be said that the intellect and that
 15 which is known in actuality are the same, but not intellect and that which is known in potentiality. Now, the intelligible species is the immediate principle of knowing. Hence whatever has in it an actually intelligible species, can know, but whichever species is in the stone or in a material thing outside the intellect is only intelligible in potency, and therefore no intelligible thing outside our intellect has
 20 its immediate principle of knowing in itself, and for that reason cannot know. But a species which is in the intellect is intelligible in actuality, and therefore, since our intellect has its immediate principle of knowledge in itself, it can know aside from the fact that it is intelligible, and it is not in this way in other things.

{Ad 1.2} To the second argument it must be said that those things are said
 25 to be separate from matter which are known in actuality. Hence, the Philosopher says in the third book of *De anima* that exactly as things are separable from matter so they are with respect to the intellect., but that which is known in actuality and the intellect are the same, just as that which is perceptible in actuality and the sense. But the perceptible in actuality and sense are not the same except
 30 because the same form belongs to both, since the species which is caused by something perceptible, as by an agent, is in the sense as in a subject, and in the same way in the case under consideration: That which is known in actuality and the intellect are said to be the same, because the species of that which is known in actuality is the realizing form which informs the intellect, and through this

25–27 Arist. *De anima* III.4 429b21–2.

form the intellect knows itself discursively and not through its essence.

{Ad 1.3} To the third argument it must be said that the intellect of an intelligence is perfect actuality because it always is actualized. For in itself it has connate species. But by itself our intellect is in potentiality, i.e. “possible” <intellect>, and the agent intellect itself, insofar as it is actualized, is the actualization of the intelligible things, and not intellect before it knows.

{Ad 1.4} To the fourth argument it must be said that the act of knowing is caused by the union of the object and the intellect, but although nothing is more united with the intellect than it is with itself, it still cannot be united with itself as an object, because the object of our intellect is the nature of a thing that is outside the soul, and that cannot be united with the intellect except through a species.

{Ad 1.5} To the final argument it must be said that the intellect knows itself both through a species and through an activity, but not through its own species, as the argument proves, but through a species which belongs to something else. Similarly, it knows itself through its own activity, and it knows that activity through still another activity. Therefore, it must be understood that there is an intellect which is its own knowing, and therefore it knows its own essence and knowing through a unitary activity, because they are the same, namely the intellect of God. And there is another intellect which is not its own knowing, but which through its essence is an object of its own knowing, namely the intellect of an intelligence, and although its knowing and its essence differ, it still knows its own essence and knowing through a unitary act, since knowing is the perfection of its essence, and a thing and its perfection are known through a unitary act. But the human intellect is neither its own knowing nor is its essence an object of its own knowing, and therefore it cannot know the object and its own knowing through a unitary act, because its knowing is not the perfection of its object. For knowing the stone is not the perfection of the stone, but it is the perfection of the intellect, and therefore it is not possible to know the stone and the knowing itself through a unitary act. Hence, in this way it must be said to the argument that the intellect knows its own activity and its object through a different activity, and it knows that activity by an act, and thus ad infinitum, and it is not problematic to proceed ad infinitum in activities of the intellect and reason.

To the second proof it must be said that a sense senses by an alteration of a corporeal organ, and nothing corporeal alters itself, and therefore the sense is not altered except by something external. But the intellect is not altered by

the alteration of the corporeal organ, but spiritually, and something spiritual is perfectly capable of turning itself on itself, and therefore Plato said that the first mover moves itself, because he held that the first mover is the soul, and held that its functions – liking, rejoicing etc. – are its movement.

4 Appendix 1: Question lists

4.1 John Dinsdale: *Quaestiones in De anima*

No.	Title	Witnesses
	Prooemium	B148rb–148va, O164ra–b
Liber primus		
I.1	Utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia.	B148va, O164rb–164va
I.2	Utrum aliqua scientia sit de anima vel de corpore animato ut de subiecto.	B148vb–149ra, O164va–b
I.3	Utrum scientia sit quid bonum et honorabile.	B149ra–b, O164vb–165ra
I.4	Utrum scientia de anima sit dignior aliis secundum certitudinem et subiecti dignitatem.	B149rb–149va, O165ra–b
I.5	Utrum universale nihil sit aut per posterius.	B149va–150ra, O165rb–165va
I.6	Utrum accidentia magnam partem conferant ad cognoscendum quod quid est.	B150ra–b, O165va–b
I.7	Utrum aliqua sit propria operatio animae in qua non communicet cum corpore.	B150rb–150vb, O165vb–166rb
I.8	Utrum naturalis differat ab aliis artificibus in definiendo.	B150vb–151ra, O166rb–166vb
Liber secundus		
II.1	Utrum anima sit forma simplex vel compositum.	B151ra–151va, O166vb–167ra
II.2	Utrum omni animae conveniat esse actum corporis.	B151va–152ra, O167ra–167vb
II.3	Utrum corpus cuius actus est anima sit in actu per aliam formam quam per animam.	B152ra–154r, O167vb–170r

Table 1: List of questions in John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima* based on the Oriel witness.

Table 1 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
II.4	Utrum anima debeat uniri corpori organico.	B154rb–154v, O170rb–170va
II.5	Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum.	B154vb–155ra, O170va–b
II.6	Utrum in homine sensitivum, vegetativum et intellectivum sint tres animae aut tres potentiae animae.	B155ra–155vb, O170vb–171v
II.7	Utrum in parte animalis vel plantae decisae sit anima.	B155vb, O171vb–172ra
II.8	Utrum anima sit sua potentia.	B155vb–156rb, O172ra–b
II.9	Utrum potentiae distinguantur per actus et obiecta.	B156rb, O172rb–172va
II.10	Utrum in potentiis animae sit ordo secundum prius et posterius.	B156rb–156va, O172va–b
II.11	Utrum potentiae distinguuntur per actus et obiecta.	B156va–b, O172vb
II.12	Utrum potentiae animae sint quinque.	B156vb–157rb, O172vb–173r
II.13	Utrum tres sint potentiae vegetativae, scilicet nutritiva, generativa et augmentativa.	B157ra–b, O173va–b
II.14	Utrum alimentum sit obiectum vegetativae in qualibet operatione.	B157rb–157va, O173vb
II.15	Utrum alimentum convertatur in veram naturam rei.	B157va–b, O173vb–174rb
II.16	Utrum semen sit de substantia generantis vel de superfluentia.	B157vb–158ra, O174rb–174va
II.17	Utrum virtus in semine sit productiva sensitivae.	B158ra–b, O174va–b

Table 1: List of questions in John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima* based on the Oriel witness.

Table 1 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
II.18	Utrum virtus in semine sit productiva intellectivae.	B158rb–158va, O174vb–175ra
II.19	Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva.	B158va–b, O175ra–175va
II.20	Utrum sit ponere sensum agentem.	B158vb–159rb, O175va–176ra
II.21	Utrum sensus decipiat circa proprium sensibile.	B159rb–159va, O176ra–b
II.22	Utrum sensibilia communia sint sensibilia per se.	B159va–b, O176rb–176va
II.23	Utrum Diarii filius et huiusmodi sint sensibilia per accidens.	B159vb, O176va–b
II.24	Utrum color sit visibile per se sive secundum se.	B159vb–160rb, O176vb–177va
II.25	Utrum lux sit de essentia coloris.	B160rb–160va, O177va–b
II.26	Utrum multiplicatio lucis in medio sit successiva vel in instanti.	B160va–161rb, O177vb–178rb
II.27	Posito quod medium sit infinitum, utrum corpus luminosum possit totum medium illuminare.	B161ra–b, O178rb–178va
II.28	Utrum lux sit substantia vel accidens.	B161rb, O178va–b
II.29	Utrum aliqua de nocte visa habeant videri tantum de nocte, ut lucerna, et de die, ut colorata.	B161rb–161va, O178vb–179ra
II.30	Utrum visibile supra organum positum videatur.	B161va–b, O179rb–179va
II.31	Utrum sonus causetur ex percussione corporum ad invicem.	B161vb–162ra, O179va–b
II.32	Utrum sonus sit in aere vel in percutiente aut percusso.	B162ra–b, O179vb

Table 1: List of questions in John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima* based on the Oriel witness.

Table 1 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
II.33	Utrum sonus multiplicetur ad auditum cum motu aeris.	B162rb–162va
II.34	Utrum sonus sit in medio secundum esse intentionale vel rationale.	B162va–b
II.35	Utrum sonus directus et refluxus ut ecco sit unus.	B162vb–163ra
II.36	Utrum vox generetur a virtute imaginativa.	B163ra–b
II.37	Utrum homo habeat peiorem olfactum aliis.	B163rb–163va
II.38	Utrum odor multiplicetur in medio tantum intentionaliter vel cum fumili evaporatione.	B163va–b
II.39	Utrum gustus sit quidam tactus.	B163vb–164ra
II.40	Utrum sapor multiplicet se per se.	B164ra
II.41	Utrum sapor multiplicet se intentionaliter vel materialiter.	B164ra–b
II.42	Utrum tactus sit unus sensus.	B164rb–164va
II.43	Utrum caro sit organum an aliud.	B164va–b
II.44	Utrum in tactu requiritur medium extrinsecum.	B164vb–165ra
II.45	Utrum sensus sit susceptivus specierum sensibilibus sine materia.	B165ra–b
II.46	Utrum excellens sensibile corrumpat sensum.	B165rb
II.47	Utrum sint tantum quinque sensus.	B165va–b
II.48	Utrum sensu particulariter percipimus nos sentire ut visu videre aut sensu aliquo aut sensu communi.	B165vb–166rb
II.49	Utrum oporteat ponere sensum communem propter distinctionem vel participationem inter sensibilia diversa animae.	B166rb–166va
II.50	Utrum sensus communis sit unicus an plures.	B166va–167ra
II.51	Utrum organum sensus communis sit internis iuxta cor vel non.	B167rb

Table 1: List of questions in John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima* based on the Oriel witness.

Table 1 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
II.52	Utrum sensus communis simul apprehendat sensibilia diversi generis.	B167ra–167va
II.53	Utrum phantasia differat a sensu.	B167va–b
II.54	Utrum phantasia sit motus factus a sensu secundum actum.	B167vb–168ra
II.55	Utrum fantasia insit omni animali.	B168ra–b
II.56	Utrum opinio pertineat ad sensum vel ad intellectum.	B168rb
II.57	Utrum convenienter distinguantur istae quatuor, scilicet sensus communis, imaginativa, aestimativa et memorativa.	B168rb–168vb
Liber tertius		
III.1	Utrum intellectus sit essentia animae vel potentia.	B168vb–169ra
III.2	Utrum intellectus sit potentia passiva.	B169ra–b
III.3	Utrum oporteat intellectum esse immixtum ita quod nullam naturam corpoream habeat ad hoc ut omnia cognoscit.	B169rb–169va
III.4	Utrum oporteat intellectum privari organo ut omnia cognoscit.	B169va–b
III.5	Utrum intellectus humanus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus.	B169vb–170va
III.6	Utrum intellectus sit incorruptibilis.	B170va–171ra
III.7	Utrum anima intellectiva in qualibet parte corporis sit tota.	B171ra–171va
III.8	Utrum intellectus intelligat rem corpoream et sensibilem.	B171va–b
III.9	Utrum intellectus intelligat per species a sensibilibus acceptas an per species innatas aliunde adquisitas vel per essentiam vel qualitercumque.	B171vb–172r

Table 1: List of questions in John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima* based on the Oriel witness.

Table 1 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
III.10	Utrum species possint manere in intellectu cum actu non intelligit.	B172v–173ra
III.11	Utrum intellectus per species quas penes se habet, possit intelligere absque hoc quod convertat se ad phantasmata.	B173ra–b
III.12	Utrum intellectus intelligat res corporales et materiales abstrahendo a phantasmatibus.	B173rb–173v
III.13	Utrum species abstracta sit illud quod intelligitur primo et per se aut res cuius est species.	B173vb–174r
III.14	Utrum intellectus intelligat singulare per se.	B174rb–174va
III.15	Utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit alia.	B174v–175ra
III.16	Utrum intellectus possibilis sit actu aliquid eorum quae sunt antequam intelligat.	B175ra–b
III.17	Utrum necesse sit ponere intellectum agentem.	B175rb–175v
III.18	Utrum intellectus agens sit pars animae nostrae.	B175vb–176ra
III.19	Utrum intellectus agens abstrahendo intelligat.	B176ra–b
III.20	Utrum omnia a nobis intellecta fiant intellecta per intellectum agentem.	B176rb–176va
III.21	Utrum substantia quae est huius intellectus obiectum faciat ex re speciem per quam cognoscat sicut et a materia.	B176va–177ra
III.22	Utrum intellectus noster intelligat componendo et dividendo.	B177ra–b
III.23	Utrum intellectus per prius intelligat divisibile quam indivisibile.	B177rb–177va
III.24	Utrum intellectus possit esse falsus.	B177va–b

Table 1: List of questions in John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima* based on the Oriel witness.

Table 1 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
III.25	Utrum verum et falsum primo et principaliter sit in intellectu componente et dividente.	B177vb–178ra
III.26	Utrum intellectus practicus et speculativus sint diversae potentiae.	B178ra–b
III.27	Utrum sit ponere plures potentias in parte intellectiva quam possibilem et agentem.	B178rb–178va
III.28	Utrum intellectus noster magnitudine coniunctus possit cognoscere vel intelligere.	B178va–179ra
III.29	Utrum appetivum sit distinctum ab aliis potentiis animae.	B179rb–179va
III.30	Utrum appetitus dividatur in rationalem et sensitivum.	B179va
III.31	Utrum appetitus sensitivus dividatur in irascibilem et concupibilem.	B179va–b
III.32	Utrum appetitus rationalis dividitur in irascibilem et concupibilem.	B179vb–180ra
III.33	Utrum voluntas quae est appetitus rationalis sit nobilior potentia quam intellectus.	B180ra–b
III.34	Utrum appetitus rationalis quae est voluntas moveat intellectum.	B180rb–180va
III.35	Utrum appetitus sensitivus oboediat intellectu et rationi.	B180vb–181ra
III.36	Utrum intellectus et appetitus et appetibile moveant.	B181ra–b
III.37	Utrum potentia motiva ab aliis sit distincta.	B181rb–181va
III.38	Utrum animalis moti ex se necesse est a materia partem quiescere et immobilem esse.	B181va–b

Table 1: List of questions in John Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima*, based on the Oriel witness.

4.2 Anonymus: *Quaestiones in De anima I*, Merton 276 ff. 13r–16v

No.	Title	Witnesses
	Prooemium	M13ra
I.1	Utrum de anima possit [posset ms] esse scientia.	M13r–14v
I.2	Utrum ista scientia sit de anima tamquam de subiecto.	M14vb–15va
I.3	Utrum definitiones generum et specierum sunt definitiones rerum existentium extra animam.	M15v–16v

Table 2: List of questions in Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De anima I*, Merton 276, ff. 13r–16v.

4.3 Anonymus: *Quaestiones in De anima III*, Oriel 33, ff. 180r–182v

No.	Title	Witnesses
III.1	Utrum intellectus humanus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus.	O180ra–180va
III.2	Utrum intellectus noster possit intelligere aliquid corporeum habentem magnitudinem.	O180va–b
III.3	Utrum intellectus noster intelligat per species acquisitas.	O180vb–181rb
III.4	Utrum neccesse sit ponere intellectum agentem.	O181rb–182ra
III.5	Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus informatus aliqua specie actu intelligat per illam neccesse est aliquod phantasma speculari.	O182ra–182va

Table 3: List of questions in Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De anima III*, Oriel 33, ff. 180r–182v.

4.4 Anonymus: *Quaestiones in De anima III*, Merton 276 ff. 165r–176r

No.	Title	Witnesses
Liber tertius		
III.1	Utrum intellectus materialis sit virtus pure passiva.	M165ra–167ra
III.2	Utrum intellectus materialis sit multiplicatus ad multiplicationem hominum.	M167ra–169v
III.3	Utrum intentiones in intellectu sint eternae.	M169vb–171r
III.4	Utrum oportet recipiens denudari a natura recepti.	M171rb–171vb
III.5	Utrum intellectus materialis sit in substantia separata a materia.	M171vb–173ra
III.6	Utrum intellectus materialis copuletur nobis solum per formas in virtute imaginativa.	M173r–173va
III.7	Utrum intellectus materialis sit aliqua forma materialis vel forma intelligibilis.	M173vb–174va
III.8	Utrum neccesse sit ponere intellectum agentem.	M174v–176r

Table 4: List of questions in Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De anima III*, Merton 276, ff. 165r–176r.

5 Appendix 2: John Dinsdale and Giles of Rome's prologues

Dinsdale's prologue follows that of Giles of Rome's *expositio* to *De anima* very closely. The synoptic presentation of the two texts below will immediately reveal that Giles's text generally is a bit more verbose than Dinsdale's. But reading the two texts in tandem will also show that Dinsdale follows Giles from beginning to end in the expository structure and phrasing, and often so closely that we find a verbatim identity between the two.

The text of Dinsdale's prologue is that of my edition. Giles's prologue is nothing like a fully critical text, as it is preserved in around 46 witnesses according to Lohr's records.³⁴ But I have established a working text based on two witnesses. The witnesses are Munich, BSB 2 Inc.c.a. 2805 (siglum M), an incunabulum from 1496, and Paris, BnF Lat. 16616 (siglum P), a manuscript from the late 13th century. These were chosen primarily because they were readily available in online digital reproductions.³⁵ To my slight surprise the collation of the two witnesses revealed that the much later Munich incunabulum tended to have a better text, presumably because the editor of that edition has either had access to a very good manuscript or just made some very sensible emendations. That the scribe of the Paris manuscript has made several corrections *in scribendo* where the correction results in a text that is identical to M's may favour the first of those two explanations. In this interim edition I have therefore chosen M as the base text and supplied it with the text from P when necessary. As with the edition of Dinsdale's text, I have classicised the orthography and imposed my own paragraphing and punctuation. Both apparatuses refer to Giles's text, as the apparatuses to Dinsdale's text are already printed in the edition proper. The editor of *CIMAGL*, Heine Hansen, suggested some emendations to the text which are indicated in the apparatus with the sigil 'HH'.

³⁴ Lohr 1967, p. 332.

³⁵ Munich: <http://daten.digital-sammlungen.de/db/0004/bsb00045193/images/>.
Paris: <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9078336c>. Both last visited on April 16, 2017.

Fidi interpretis Aristotelis Aegidii M 3ra, P 1r
 Romani heremitarum ordinis in libros
De anima expositio.

Ex romanorum spectabili ac illu-
 stri prosapia oriundo sibi quam plu- 5
 rimum dilecto domino Iacobo domini
 Johannis Caietani Rothomagensi ca-
 nonica Frater Aegidius Romanus or-
 dinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Au-
 gustini seipsum ac promptam ad sua 10
 beneplacita voluntatem.

Dum intra me tacitus cogitarem
 quid vere generositati erga quam
 tanta dilectione afficiorum muneris
 offerre valerem, circumspecto nu- 15
 mero ingenio et considerata vestra in-
 dustria naturali decrevi nihil per me
 posse vobis transmitti decentius ni-
 hil destinari utilius quam expositio-
 nem libri *De anima* cuius cognitio ad 20
 omnem veritatem videtur proficere, et
 maxime ad naturalem ad quam capes-
 sendam tanto vester intellectus super
 communem modum hominum vide-
 tur esse dispositus quanto Deus al- 25
 tissimus prae multis aliis personam
 vestram nobilioribus naturalibus pe-
 rornavit. Suscipite ergo dilecte caris-
 sime destinatum donum animo lae-
 tabundo, quod tanto magis rationem 30
 doni participat et tanto magis se esse
 placitum probat necnon et tanto ma-
 iorem meam caritatem et sollicitu-

1–3 fidi ... expositio] *om.* P 3 expositio] *om.* M; Incipit sententia super libro *De anima* edita
 a fratre Egidio Romano ordinis fratrum heremitarum *add.* P 6 domini] *om.* P 10 ac] et P
 22 naturalem] naturam P 23 vester] videtur M super] supra P 24–25 videtur] *om.* M
 31–32 esse placitum] placitum esse P

O 164ra, B
148rb

BONORUM HONORABILIVM ET CETERA. Philosophus in secundo *Physicorum* volens investigare et ostendere terminos et limites considerationis physicae sive naturalis ait usquequo oportet physicum speciem et quod quid est considerare, id est usque ad quem terminum se extendit consideratio physica sive philosophi naturalis quam habet de speciebus, id est formis, quae sunt quod quid est, id est quae pertinent ad rationem quiditatis, et respondet ibidem dicens quemadmodum medicus considerat nervum et fabrum aes, considerat physicus formam sive speciem et quod quid est, quia non omnis consideratio nervi spectat ad medicum, nec quicquid potest considerari de aere pertinet ad fabrum, sic nec omnis consideratio de formis pertinet ad physicum. Advidendum igitur qualiter praedicti artifices considerant de praedictis.

dinem erga vestram nobilitatem arguit et ostendit quanto postulationem praeveniens oblatum esse dinoscitur potius quam petitum.

Philosophus in secundo *Physicorum* volens investigare terminos et limites considerationis philosophi naturalis ait usquequo physicum oportet cognoscere speciem et quod quid est, id est usque ad quem terminum potest se extendere consideratio physica sive consideratio philosophi naturalis quam habet de speciebus, id est de formis quae sunt quod quid est, id est quae principaliter pertinent ad rationem quiditatis. Huic autem quaestioni et inquisitioni respondet ibidem Philosophus dicens quod sic oportet considerare physicum formam, speciem et quod quid est, quemadmodum oportet medicum considerare nervum et fabrum aes, non enim omnis consideratio nervi spectat ad medicum, neque quicquid potest considerari de aere pertinet ad fabrum, nec omnis consideratio de formis spectat ad philosophum naturalem, quare si videre volumus qualiter praefati artifices considerant de praedictis, videndum est qualis sit consideratio medici, fabri et physici.

1–2 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a1. 5–6 Arist. *Phys.* II.1 194b10–11. 5–7 Arist. *Ph.* II.2 194b10–11. 16–22 Arist. *Phys.* II.1 194b11–12. 13–17 Arist. *Ph.* II.2 194b11–12.

2 postulationem] postulationi M 8–9 physicum oportet] oportet physicum P 14 quod] om. P 15 quae] om. P 17 et] om. P respondet] om. P; idem *add.* M 17–18 ibidem philosophus] Philosophus ibidem M 24 neque] nec P 25 pertinet] spectat P

Videndum est qualis sit consideratio medici et fabri et physici. Medicus autem intendit principaliter sanitatem facere, unde si de nervo considerat, hoc est ut in eo fiat sanitas, et ideo quaecumque consideratio de nervo, prout deservit sanitati, pertinet ad medicum, si tamen sit aliqua consideratio transcendens istam, subterfugiet considerationem medici. Similiter, quia faber considerat de materia instrumentorum artificialium, quaecumque consideratio aeris, prout est materia instrumentorum artificialium, pertinet ad fabrum, si qua tamen sit consideratio transcendens, declinat eius considerationem. Ex istis patet qualis sit consideratio physici et ad quem terminum se extendit. Quicquid enim a physico est consideratum, motui et transmutationi est coniunctum, quae enim non amplius mota movent non sunt physicae considerationis per Philosophum secundo *Physicorum*. Formae igitur omnino immateriales non coniunctae materiae motui et transmutationi subiectae subterfugiunt considerationem physici sive naturalis, sed forma quae quodammodo est immaterialis et quodammodo perfectio materiae est de consideratione na-

Medicus quidem si considerat de nervo, hoc est in quantum in eo vult inducere sanitatem, omnis igitur illa consideratio quae sanitati deservit et quae ordinatur ut sanetur nervus secundum quod huiusmodi est, spectat ad medicum. Si autem sit aliqua consideratio nervi hanc transcendens, subterfugere potest considerationem medici. Sic, quia faber considerat de aere ut ex eo possit artificialia construere, consideratio aeris, ut ordinatur ad opus vasorum aeneorum vel aliorum artificialium quae construuntur ex aere spectare potest ad fabrum aerarium. Sed si sit aliquam consideratio aeris hanc considerationem transcendens, subterfugit considerationem eius. Ex hoc ergo patere potest quae sit consideratio naturalis et usquequo se extendit consideratio eius quam habet de formis. Nam naturalis philosophus quicquid considerat est aliquo modo motui et transmutationi coniunctum, quia ut dicitur in secundo *Physicorum* quae non amplius mota movent non amplius sunt physicae considerationis, formae ergo omnino immateriales non coniunctae materiae subiectae transmutationi et motui secundum substantiam non sunt de consideratione physici. Itaque

22–25 Arist. *Ph.* II.7 198a26–30. 26–28 Arist. *Phys.* II.7 198a26–30.

1 considerat] considerant a.c. P 5 nervus] nerus a.c. P 8 hanc] hoc P 12 aeris] artis a.c. P 15 ad] sup. lin. P 15–16 fabrum] om. P 16 aerarium] aerarium (erarium) corr. ex errarium P 20 quae] qualis P 26 in] om. M quae] quod P

turalis seu physici, et est illud ultimum in quod potest consideratio physica. Talis autem forma est anima humana, et ideo ipsa est terminus et finis
5 considerationis physicae.

Unde distinguere possumus quod tres sunt gradus formarum, quaedam enim sunt omnino immateriales, et secundum dispositionem et secundum
10 substantiam, cuiusmodi sunt intelligentiae, quae sunt praeter omnem materiam sensibilem et intelligibilem per Philosophum octavo *Metaphysicae*; et quaedam sunt penitus materiales, et secundum substantiam et
15 secundum dispositionem, quia suae substantiae et suae dispositiones de materia sunt eductae, cuiusmodi sunt formae istorum inferiorum; sed quaedam
20 sunt formae medio modo se ha-

tamdiu se extendit consideratio physica erga formas donec perveniat ad formam illam quae aliquo modo est immaterialis et aliquo modo est perfectio materiae, ibi autem erit status
5 et perfectus terminus considerationis physicae. Quicquid autem est ultra formam illam considerare secundum substantiam non ulterius pertinet ad naturalem philosophum. Forma autem
10 ultima secundum considerationem philosophi, ultra quam non se extendit philosophus naturalis, ut ait Commentator secundo *Physicorum*, est anima humana.
15

Possumus igitur sic distinguere de formis dicendo quasdam esse omnino materiales, cuiusmodi sunt formae eductae de potentia | materiae tam
M 3rb
20 secundum substantiam quam secundum dispositionem; quaedam vero sunt quasi penitus immateriales, ut intelligentiae quae secundum Philosophum octavo *Metaphysicae* sunt entes praeter omnem materiam sensibilem et intelligibilem; quaedam autem
25 sunt formae mediae, ut animae humanae quae sunt perfectiones corporum. Habent enim se huiusmodi animae quasi modo medio quia, li-
30

14 Locus non inventus, sed fortasse ad Aver. In *Phys.* II comm. 72–73 (Junct. ff. 74A–F) adspicit. 10–14 Arist. *Metaph.* VIII.5 1044b27–29(?), cf. VI.1 1026a10–18. 24–26 Arist. *Metaph.* VIII.5 1044b27–29(?). Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* VI.1 1026a10–18.

1 se extendit] extendet se P 2 formas] formans a.c. P 6 perfectus] om. P 10 philosophum] om. P 10–11 forma autem] huiusmodi autem forma P 12 philosophi] physicam P 16 igitur] autem P sic distinguere] distinguere sic P 20–21 secundum²] om. P 24 philosophum] 29 se huiusmodi] inv. a.c. P

bentes, quae secundum substantiam sunt immateriales et secundum dispositiones sunt materiales, cuiusmodi sunt animae humanae. Unde primae
 5 formae sunt praeter considerationem physicam, sed a secundis formis incipit consideratio physica et terminatur ad tertiam, incipit enim consideratio physici a formis inferioribus et
 10 terminatur ad animam humanam.

Ex istis patet ulterius quem ordinem habeat liber iste inter libros naturales, quia modus physicus et modus metaphysicus quodammodo sunt
 15 oppositi. Modus enim physicus habet statum in supremo sed non in infimo, habet enim statum quantum ad modum abstractionis, qui status est supremus, quia aliqua sunt ita abstracta quod excedunt considerationem physicam, et aliqua sunt ita abstracta quod ultra ea non se extendit
 20 consideratio physica, sed quantum ad modum concretionis, qui est modus infimus, non habet physicus statum, non enim est aliqua forma ita materiae concreta quod subterfugiat considerationem physici . Immo quanto

cet secundum substantiam non educantur de potentia materiae, tamen secundum dispositionem de materia sunt eductae. Incipit itaque consideratio philosophi naturalis a formis penitus materialibus et terminatur usque
 5 ad animam humanam quae est quodammodo materialis et quodammodo immaterialis, sed cum perventum est ad talem animam, sistit physicus nec
 10 se extendit ad ultiores | formas, P 1v quia de formis abstractis, cuiusmodi sunt intelligentiae, eo quod non motae moveant non ulterius considerat philosophus naturalis.
 15

Hoc viso patere potest quem ordinem habeat hoc liber qui dicitur *De anima*, quem habemus prae manibus, inter alios libros naturales. Nam modus physicus et metaphysicus quodammodo videtur oppositus eo quod
 20 modus physicus et naturalis quasi habet statum in supremo et non in infimo. Habet enim statum secundum abstractionem, qui est supremus, et
 25 non secundum concretionem, qui est infimus. Nulla enim est consideratio adeo concreta et adeo coniuncta materiae et transmutationi et motui quae propter hoc et secundum quod huiusmodi subterfugiat modum physici.
 30 Est tamen aliqua consideratio adeo abstracta et adeo suprema quae non

8-9 et quodammodo immaterialis] om. P 10 physicus] philosophus M 11 se extendit] inv. P 19 libros naturales] naturales libros P 22 modus] modo a.c. P 30 et] om. P 30-31 quod huiusmodi] inv. a.c. P 31 physici] physicum P

forma magis est concreta materiae
 tanto magis cadit sub eius considera-
 tione, et hoc est intelligendum sup-
 posita abstractione a singularibus, si
 5 enim ad individua et numero singula-
 ria velimus considerare, hoc praeter-
 greditur considerationem physicam.
 Sed modus metaphysicus se habet
 econtrario, quia statum habet in in-
 10 fimis sed non in supremo, quia ali-
 qua forma est ita materiae concreta
 quod eius consideratio non pertineat
 ad metaphysicum, sed non est ali-
 qua forma ita abstracta quod excedat
 15 considerationem metaphysicam, me-
 taphysica enim est circa causas altis-
 simas. Unde quanto consideratio est
 magis abstractorum, tanto magis me-
 taphysicalis est. Hoc est intelligen-
 20 dum de consideratione per artem hu-
 manam inventa, si qua enim sit con-
 sideratio abstracta per inspirationem
 acquisita, ipsa excedit consideratio-
 nem metaphysici, sed talis non est
 25 praesentis speculationis.

B 148va

spectat ad naturalem et ad quam phy-
 sicus non se potest extendere. Scien-
 tia vero metaphysica et divina modo
 converso se habet, nam non habet ter-
 5 minum in abstracto et in supremo sic
 quod sit aliqua consideratio adeo ab-
 stracta et excellens quae transcendat
 considerationem metaphysicam et di-
 vinam, quia quanto consideratio est
 10 altior, tanto magis est metaphysicalis
 eo quod metaphysica considerat cau-
 sas altissimas, ut dicitur in primo *Me-
 taphysicae*. Habet tamen modus me-
 taphysicus statum in infimo, quia est
 15 aliqua consideratio adeo concreta et
 contracta quae non pertinet ad me-
 taphysicum, qui est artifex commu-
 nis, licet pertinere possit ad physicum
 qui est artifex specialis. Advertendum
 20 tamen quod cum dicimus metaphysi-
 cum non habere statum in supremo,
 quia non potest esse consideratio ita
 alta quae non spectet ad ipsum, intel-
 ligendo de consideratione habita per
 25 humanam inventionem. Utrum autem
 sit aliqua consideratio inspirata tran-
 scendens considerationem metaphysi-
 cam non est praesentis speculatio-
 nis. Sic etiam, cum dicimus physi-
 cum non habere statum in infimo sic
 30 quod sit aliqua consideratio adeo con-

12–13 Arist. *Metaph.* IV.1 1003a26–28.

2 non se] se non P 4 se habet, nam] om. P habet²] circa *add. et del.* P 5 sic] ut P 7
 quae] quod P 12 in primo] secundo M; 15–16 concreta et contracta] contracta et concreta
 P 16–17 metaphysicum] metaphysicam P 18 licet] om. M; tamen P 23–24 intelligendo]
 intelligendum est P 25 inventionem] intentionem P

creta quae secundum quod huiusmodi subterfugiat considerationem physicam, intelligendum est hoc supposita abstractione quam requirit quaelibet scientia. Nam si sic concretam et materialem considerationem habere vellemus ut ad ipsa individua et singularia extenderemus eam, patet quod de talibus non considerat physicus eo quod nulla scientia circa individua et numero singularia est, quia talium, ut dicitur septimo *Metaphysicae*, non est scientia nec diffinitio.

Sic igitur intelligenda sunt quae dicta sunt, quod cum tres sint partes essentielles philosophiae (scilicet naturalis, mathematica et divina) inter artes vel scientias per artem humanam inventas, metaphysicus non recognoscit aliquam scientiam superiorem, physica etiam inter partes philosophiae essentielles quantum ad modum abstractionis non recognoscit aliquem artificem inferiorem – licet superiorem, sed mathematicus recognoscit et artificem superiorem, quia aliquis est qui magis abstrahit, et inferiorem, quia aliquis est qui magis concernit. Unde, ut dictum est, consideratio physici incipit a formis infimis et terminatur ad animam huma-

Igitur hoc modo sunt intelligenda quae diximus quod cum tres sint modi essentielles philosophiae (physicus, scilicet, metaphysicus et divinus), divinus et metaphysicus modus inter scientias humanitus inventas non recognoscit superiorem artificem nec habet statum in supremo ita quod terminetur consideratio eius ad considerationem artificis superioris. Physicus vero quantum ad modum abstractionis inter partes essentielles philosophiae non recognoscit artificem inferiorem ita quod terminetur eius consideratio ad aliquam essentialem partem philosophiae quae sit magis concreta et minoris abstractionis. Incipit itaque modus physicus, ut patet per

12 Arist. *Metaph.* VII.10 1036a2–6.

10–11 circa ... est] est circa individua et numero singularia P 15 quod] quia P 17 scilicet] om. P 18 et metaphysicus modus] modus et metaphysicus P 22 consideratio eius] eius consideratio P 27 ita] conj. HH; ut M P 28–29 essentialem partem] partem essentialem P

nam, et ex hoc patet quod liber de anima sextum gradum tenet inter libros naturales, quia primum gradum tenet liber *Physicorum*, secundum liber *De caelo et mundo*, tertium liber *De generatione et corruptione*, quartum gradum tenet liber *Meteororum*, quintum liber *De mineralibus*, sextum liber *De anima*. Unde primus est iste liber dignitate, licet ultimus sive sextus ordine doctrinae, et ideo Philosophus considerans eius dignitatem dicit quod historia de anima in primis est ponenda .

iam dicta, a formis infimis et omnino materialibus et terminatur usque ad animam humanam, quare si physicus habet statum in supremo, anima humana ad quam terminatur consideratio physica est dignissima et suprema inter ea quae considerat physicus <vel> naturalis. Hoc ergo considerans Philosophus volens commendare hunc librum in quo determinatur de omni anima, et principaliter de anima humana, ait in primis ponendam esse notitiam de anima, quod intelligendum est quantum ad ordinem dignitatis. Ordine enim doctrinae liber *De anima* non est primus inter libros naturales, sed tenet gradum sextum et dicitur sextus de naturalibus, ut probavimus in nostris editionibus quas fecimus super physicis, ordine tamen dignitatis hic est primus, ut est per habita manifestum. His itaque visis breviter ad expositionem litterae accedamus.

11–14 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a1–7.

1 dicta] *conj.* HH; dictam M P 8 vel] *suppl.* HH 11 de¹] *sup. lin.* P 15 enim] ergo P 18 et dicitur sextus] *om.* M 21 primus] *om.* M; a hoc *add.* P 22–23 visis] pertractatis P 23 breviter] *om.* P